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ABSTRACT 
This report is concerned with the escalation of capital costs 
of nuclear central station power plants between the early 1960s and 
the present. The report presents an historical overview of the 
development of the nuclear power industry and cost escalation in the 
industry, using existing data on orders and capital costs. New data 
are presented on regulatory delays in the licensing process, derived 
from a concurrent study being carried on in the Social Science group 
at Caltech. 
The conclusions of the study are that nuclear capital costs 
have escalated more rapidly than the GNP deflator or the construction 
industry price index. Prior to 1970, cost increases are related to 
bottleneck problems in the nuclear construction and supplying industries 
and the regulatory process; intervenors play only a minor role in cost 
escalation. After 1970, generic changes introduced into the licensing 
process by intervenors (including environmental impact reviews, antitrust 
reviews, more stringent safety standards) dominate the cost escalation 
picture, with bottlenecks of secondary importance. Recent increases 
in the time from application for a construction permit to commercial 
operation are related not only to intervenor actions, but also to 
suspensions, cancellations or postponements of construction by utilities 
due to unfavorable demand or financing conditions. 
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COST ESCALATION IN NUCLEAR POWER* 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Rarely in the history of United States industry has there 
been a rags-to-riches-to-rags story as dramatic as that of the 
nuclear power industry. Just twenty years ago, the AEC was 
subsidizing the construction and operation of small prototype 
reactors, pursuing a goal mandated for it by the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954, to promote a viable nuclear power industry. By the early 
1960s, the technical capabilities qf nuclear power had been 
demonstrated, but it was generally agreed within industry and the 
government that nuclear power would not be economically competitive 
with fossil fuel until the 70s. Then between 1963 and 1966, the 
two major reactor manufacturers, General Electric and Westinghouse, 
promoted nuclear power through fixed-price (turnkey) contracts at 
capital costs that made nuclear power competitive with coal for 
much of the nation. Orders for nuclear units soared during 1966 
and 1967, followed by a trough in 1969. A second wave of orders 
hit the reactor manufacturers in the early 70s, peaking in 1973. 
i'Research underlying this paper was supported in part under a 
grant from the National Science Foundation, APR-75-l6566 AOI, in part 
under funds provided by the California Energy Commission and in part 
under funds provided by ERDA, EY-76~-03-1305, EQL Block. 
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Since 1974, there has been a drastic falling off of new orders 
accompanied by cancellations of existing orders to the point where 
net new orders, 1975-1976 totaled minus 9, with 8 additional 
cancellations in 1977. 
Nuclear power which was originally hailed as the ultimate 
"clean" power source, has become highly controversial. In the 
mid-1960s the expansion of the nuclear power industry coincided 
with the growth of the environmental movement, leading to confrontations 
between utilities and intervenors in the nuclear licensing process. 
Safety issues and antitrust questions dominated the hearings up to 
the late 1960s. Then environmental issues came to the fore, leading 
to a restructuring of the licensing process following the Calvert 
Cliffs decision in 1971. But recently, an even more fundamental 
problem has hit the industry. Environmentalists and many neutral 
observors alike argue that even if nuclear units are safe, and even 
if nuclear power meets environmental standards, nonetheless nuclear 
units should not be built because they are simply too expensive 
relative to other alternatives, particularly coal fired power 
plants. It is this issue of the cost of nuclear power that is the 
central topic of this paper. 
The basic economic advantage of nuclear power has always 
been low fuel costs relative to fossil fuel units. The economic 
viability of nuclear power is currently under attack on the ground 
that other costs of nuclear power are overwhelming this fuel cost 
advantage. Specifically, it is argued that: 
1. Escalation of capital costs for nuclear units will, if 
it continues, more than offset the inherent fuel cost 
advantages of nuclear power. 
2. The operating performance of the new large (1000 MWe and 
over) nuclear units has been poor, resulting in low 
plant availability factors and high maintenance costs. 
Coupled with high capital costs per kwh of electricity 
generated, it is argued that the result is a total 
cost per kwh greater for nuclear units than for coal 
units in much of the country. 
The discussion of this paper is concerned with escalation 
of nuclear capital costs, which is well documented in the data 
available. The argument concerning the operating performance of 
large nuclear units is still a matter of considerable controversy, 
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in large part because only two or three years of operating experience 
are available for the typical large unit. In any case, however 
the argument concerning operating performance is resolved, escalation 
of capital costs remains a central issue so far as the economics of the 
nuclear industry is concerned. 
Our approach in this paper is historical, summarizing data 
on the course of development of the nuclear power industry, and 
examining some of the leading explanations for that course of 
development. Based on previous unsuccessful attempts by the AEC 
and others to predict the future course of the industry, it might 
be well to point out that we do not attempt any such projections 
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here. Instead, we feel that there is a contribution to be made 
simply by recounting what has happened and attempting to understand 
that. 
We examine in detail the two basic explanations that have 
been offered for capital cost escalation in nuclear power; namely, 
first, the argument that cost increases are related to the activities 
of intervenors in the nuclear licensing process; and, second, the 
argument that cost increases reflect bottleneck problems in 
construction, equipment supplying industries, and in the licensing 
process. As will be developed later, capital cost increases in 
the nuclear industry far exceed those that would have resulted 
simply from inflation of the general price level, or even 
inflation of the construction industry price level. Hence an 
explanation of the differential rate of escalation of nuclear costs 
must ultimately rest on characteristics specific to the nuclear 
industry. 
Our general conclusions are these: in the early years of 
commercial development of the nuclear power industry (1966-1970), 
the bottleneck hypothesis accounts for most of the cost increases 
that occurred; but, since 1970, while bottleneck effects are still 
present, the procedural and substantive effects of intervention in 
the licensing processes have dominated the cost picture. We develop 
these conclusions in the course of a narrative description of the 
economic history of the industry, rather than attempting an explicit 
statistical treatment aimed at identifying the quantitative importance 
of these two underlying hypotheses. Data problems relating to 
small sample size, site specific characteristics of nuclear units, 
serial and auto correlation, and other related issues argue against 
the reliability of sophisticated statistical models in the analysis 
of the cost escalation problem. 
The period from the early 1960s to the present has been 
one of dramatic changes in the technology and costs of power 
generation, not only in the nuclear industry, but also in coal, oil 
and natural gas. ~fureover, it has been a period during which the 
federal government has played an increasingly important role in 
influencing investment decisions by electric utilities. Thus in 
our analysis of the development of the nuclear power industry, we 
place special emphasis on the information available to decision 
makers at the time that decisions were made and how that information 
was used, rather than judgements as to whether the decisions make 
sense from the point of view of informed hindsight. With one or 
two notable exceptions, a rather consistent picture of the period 
can be constructed using the usual model of the economist, namely 
that decision makers, whether utilities or reactor manufacturers, 
tended to make profit maximizing choices based on the best data 
available, and that the market for nuclear units was relatively 
responsive to changes in information. 
To develop these points, we begin with a brief description 
of the pattern of growth in nuclear generating capacity and changes 
in nuclear costs. Then we turn to a detailed description of the 
economic decisions which created those patterns. 
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BACKGROUND: THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR POWER 
Table 1 summarizes the statistics on the growth of the 
nuclear power industry over the period 1955 to 1976. The term 
NSSS refers to "nuclear steam supply system," the heart.of the 
nuclear unit. As indicated by the final four columns, units ordered 
up through 1961 were mainly small prototype reactors (capacity of less 
than 100 MWe), but beginning in 1962, commercial size reactors 
dominate the picture. The history of the industry has been characterized 
by a rapid growth in unit size, the typical unit under order being 
in the 600 MWe range in the mid-1960s in contrast to a typical size 
of 1000 MWe and more in the mid-1970s. Except for a handful of large 
coal units, only nuclear plants are built in the 1000 MWe and over 
range, even today. 
Construction and operation of a nuclear plant requires 
licenses from the AEC (now NRC). The licensing-construction process 
involves four basic stages: applying for and receiving a construction 
permit; building under a construction permit until construction is 
far enough along so that the design is finalized, at which time an 
operating license application is filed; applying for and receiving 
an operating license; testing under the operating license until 
approval is received for operating the plant commercially, under 
full power. The second pair of columns in Table llists the number 
and capacity of units attaining commercial status for each year 
in the 1955-1976 time span. Finally, the last two columns of the 
table list the installed capacity of the nuclear power industry, 
figures that reflect both the commissioning of new units and the 
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TABLE 1 
GROWTH OF NUGLEAR POWER 
NSSS Orders Units Attaining Installed Com'l Status Capacity 
Net 
Year Orders Canc. Orders No. MWe No. MWe 
1955 5 5 
1956 2 2 
1957 2 2 
1958 3 3 
1959 1 1 
1960 1 200 1 200 
1961 1 1 1 175 2 375 
1962 1 1 1 265 3 640 
1963 4 4 2 140 5 780 
1964 3 50 8 830 
1965 7 7 1 72 9 902 
1966 21 21 1 90 10 992 
1967 31 31 1 40 9 1004 
1968 16 16 2 1025 10 2007 
1969 8 8 2 1260 12 3267 
1970 15 1 14 3 1796 15 5036 
1971 21 1 20 6 3615 21 8678 
1972 38 5 33 8 5673 29 14351 
1973 37 5 32 7 4513 36 18864 
1974 33 11 22 11 9527 46 28351 
1975 4 6 -2 10 8837 56 37188 
1976 3 10 -7 3 2627 59 39815 
Source: Status of Central Station Nuclear Power Reactor z Significant 
Milestones, ERDA-30, July 1976, and Electrical World, 1965-1977. 
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decomissioning (or shutdowns) of older units. 
There is a pronounced cyclic character to orders for NSSS's, 
a feature common to all capital goods industries. This leaves it 
at least open to question whether the recent falling off of orders 
is simply a hiatus before a new cyclical revival, or whether the 
decline signals a permanent bottoming out of orders. 
The rate of growth in installed capacity has been impressive, 
with capacity doubling approximately every two years over the 1966-1976 
period. Moreover, it is clear that whatever is the long term economic 
picture for nuclear power, units already in the pipeline will result 
in large increases in installed capacity for a number of years to come. 
As of the end of 1976, there were 59 nuclear units operating to produce 
power in the United States; and as of July 1976, there were 134 units 
(with average size perhaps 50 percent larger than the average of 
installed units) in the construction-licensing pipeline. 
Table 2 identifies the number of units at various stages of 
the licensing-construction process as of July 1976, and during earlier 
periods. Units already in the pipeline would increase nuclear 
generating capacity over its present level by something on the order 
of 300 percent, over the next five to ten years. About half of 
those units are still awaiting construction permits, and others 
are in early stages of construction. Units in the early stages of 
licensing and construction can be, and have been, canceled or deferred. 
Consequently, the backlog is not an irreversible commitment to nuclear 
power, although construction of many units is so far advanced that 
outright cancellation is unlikely. Appendix C to this paper provides 
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TABLE 2 
BACKLOGS IN THE LICENSING-CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
(UNITS IN EACH PROCESS AT END OF YEAR) 
Primary Testing For 
Year CP Construction OL Commercial Total 
1955 2 2 
1956 1 3 4 
1957 4 4 
1958 1 3 2 6 
1959 6 3 2 11 
1960 1 8 2 11 
1961 1 3 7 11 
1962 1 1 3 6 11 
1963 2 2 2 5 11 
1964 1 4 1 4 10 
1965 4 3 3 2 12 
1966 15 7 3 2 27 
1967 26 17 4 4 51 
1968 15 31 13 1 60 
1969 19 30 17 3 69 
1970 27 26 26 6 85 
1971 35 14 37 3 89 
1972 33 18 36 1 88 
1973 47 24 32 6 109 
1974 67 40 25 9 141 
1975 65 48 25 2 140 
July 1976 60 48 24 2 134 
Source: Status of Central Station Nuclear Power Reactors, 
Significant Mi1estones~ ERDA-30, July 1976. 
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details on orders, cancellations and delays in the licensing-construction 
process. 
The increase in the reported cost of nuclear power plants 
has been as dramatic as the growth of the nuclear industry. Units 
coming on line in the late 1960s and early 1970s had reported costs 
in the range of $150 per kilowatt; by 1976 reported costs for units 
coming on line had increased to $560 per kilowatt. Thus, capital 
costs ($/kw) of nuclear units have increased by approximately 300 
percent over the 1968-1976 period, while the general price index 
has increased by "only" 67 percent. l However, it is important to 
emphasize that "reported" costs in the early years (1968-1971) 
almost certainly understated the true costs for the units coming 
on line during that period, so that cost comparisons involving 
these early years are next to worthless. But even when the early 
years are ignored, the rate of increase in capital costs for nuclear 
units far outstrips the rate of general inflation. Table 3 
summarizes data on capital costs using both FPC and AEC/ERDA figures 
(see Appendix A for details). The period 1968-1971 is dominated 
by the so-called "turnkey" plants, where reported costs (by utilities) 
are generally agreed to be far less than costs incurred (by 
reactor manufacturers) in the construction of these units. To identify 
the factors responsible for increasing costs and to explain how the 
nuclear power industry continued to grow for a time in the face of 
substantial cost increases, a more detailed account of the economic 
history of nuclear power is required. We begin with a discussion 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
TABLE 3 
REPORTED CAPITAL COSTS OF 
NEW NUCLEAR UNITS 
1968-1976 
FPC AND AEC/ERDA 
Capital Cost $/kw 
FPC AEC/ERDA 
Avg. Range Avg. Range 
164 153-180 192 165-228 
215 163-262 205 157-247 
138 114-161 127 116-155 
146 101-185 139 109-169 
188 121-353 217 122-333 
251 161-393 240 184-383 
362 258-546 329 184-504 
n.a. 428 251-518 
n.a. 560 415-692 
Sources: FPC, Steam Electric Plant Construction Cost 
and Annual Production Expenses, 1968-1974; 
AEC/ERDA, Central Station Nuclear Plants, 
selected issues 1968-1977 
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of the turnkey period, during which construction of the first 
large (over 400 MW) commercial reactors commenced. 
THE TURNKEY ERA, 1963-1966 2 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provided a mandate for the 
AEC to develop and regulate a commercial nuclear power industry. 
The first stage in this effort was a program of research and 
development activities designed to identify commercially viable 
reactor types. This program, designated as the Power Reactor 
Demonstration Program (PRDP) , involved partial AEC financing 
(in collaboration with utilities) of a number of small reactors 
between 1955 and 1961. By 1962, the LWR (light water reactor) 
had been established as the most immediately promising of the 
reactor types, with the breeder reactor and gas cooled reactor 
still at a development stage. 
The problem with the LWR was that capit.al costs for the 
small units that had been constructed under PRDP were too high to 
provide competitive generating costs relative to fossil fuel power 
plants. Commercialization of the LWR required a move to larger 
capacity units, say in the 200-400 MWe and over range, where 
capital costs per kw were expected to show a sizeable drop. But 
utilities were not willing to undertake the risks of financing 
such plants, and when the AEC showed no inclination to subsidize 
plants of this size, orders for reactors simply ceased. At this 
point, in 1962, the Joint Committee for Atomic Energy stepped into 
the picture by specifically earmarking $20 million of previously 
appropriated AEC funds for design and research and development 
assistance to subsidize construction of commercial size LWRs. 
Two reactors were financed in part by the AEC under this 
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new authorization, the last two LWRs to receive government assistance--
Connecticut Yankee (NSSS order in December 1962) and San Onofre 1 
(NSSS order in January 1963). Both of these units were built by 
Westinghouse, and both were built under so-called "turnkey" contracts. 
Turnkey contracts were contracts under which the builder of the 
reactor took on all of the responsibility for designing and building 
the unit, including any actions required to meet regulatory guidelines. 
After the plant had passed through the licensing process, including 
testing to attain commercial status, the plant was then turned over 
to the utility for operation. The typical turnkey contract also 
provided a financial guarantee in the form of a fixed price for the 
unit, this price to cover all of the costs of construction and 
licensing, exclusive of interest during construction. 
San Onofre and Connecticut Yankee were contracted for at 
prices to the utility (after deducting the AEC subsidy) of around 
$180/kw. This still left a competitive advantage to coal power 
plants, with capital costs in the $110-$160/kw range. Then, in 
December 1963, came the dramatic announcement that General Electric 
had agreed to build the Oyster Creek unit for Jersey Central at a 
turnkey price of $132jkw, with no AEC subsidy. Added to the known 
fuel cost advantages of nuclear units, this capital cost was so low 
that nuclear power was actually cheaper than coal power at Oyster 
Creek, the first instance of a nuclear unit being built on the basis 
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of economic advantages alone. 
For the next two and one-half years, General Electric, 
Westinghouse and several of the small reactor manufacturers 
(including General Atomics and Allis-Chalmers) offered turnkey 
contracts at fixed prices at or near the Oyster Creek level. In 
all, 13 plants were contracted for on a turnkey basis between 
December 1962 and mid-1966. 3 Then, in June 1966, GE announced 
that it would no longer offer complete nuclear power plants on a 
firm-price (turnkey) basis in the United States (turnkey contracts 
are still available for foreign orders). As a practical matter, 
Westinghouse also pulled out of the turnkey business at about the 
same time, although a formal announcement to this effect was not 
made until 1971. 4 
The initial response of the utility industry to the 
Oyster Creek announcement was one of cautious skepticism; only 
two nuclear units were announced in 1964 and six in 1965. But in 
1966, a flood of 23 announcements were made, most after June and 
most on a nonturnkey basis. This continued into 1967, with 27 
more announcements. Whatever else can be said about the turnkey 
era, it is a fact that for the nuclear power industry it represented 
a transition from a period of being a heavily subsidized step-child 
of the AEC to a period of being a vigorous competitor with fossil 
fuels for base load power plants. 
From all reports, the turnkey contracts signed by General 
Electric and Westinghouse turned out to be first class financial 
disasters for the two companies. Mooz (1966) cites correspondence 
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with executives of the two companies that indicate combined losses 
in the range of $1 billion, and there is corroboration for this 
estimate from the CONCEPT cost model developed by United Engineers 
and discussed in WASH-1345. Specifically, the comparisons between 
reported costs (by the utilities) of turnkey units and the WASH-1345 
estimated costs (to the contractor) are as follows. 
Reported WASH-1345 Estimated 
Cost Estimated Cost Loss 
Turnkey Units (Millions of Dollars) 
General Electric 
Oyster Creek $ 91 $ 170 $ 79 
Dresden 2, 3 230 413 183 
Millstone 97 182 85 
Quad Cities 1, 2 250 448 198 
Monticello 105 168 63 
Totals $ 773 $1381 $ 608 
Westinghouse 
San Onofre $ 97 $ 131 $ 34 
Ginna 83 161 78 
Robinson 78 179 101 
Point Beach 1, 2 128 329 201 
Connecticut Yankee 92 149 57 
Totals $ 478 $ 949 $ 471 
Combined Totals $1251 $2330 $1079 
Source: Power Plant Capital Costs, WASH-1345, AEC, October 1974. 
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The estimated losses presented above should be viewed as, 
at best, educated guesses, in part because estimates of capital 
costs prepared by United Engineers for the AEC have not proved to 
. 5 
be particularly accurate in the past. 
Whatever the exact figures, there seems little doubt that 
General Electric and Westinghouse lost substantial amounts of money 
on the turnkey contracts of the 1963-1966 period. And, because the 
turnkey era was pivotal in the history of the nuclear power industry, 
it is important to try to understand the motivations of reactor 
manufacturers and utilities at that time, and how market forces in 
the nuclear power industry might have operated. 
One version of the history of the turnkey era goes something 
like this. 6 General Electric negotiated the Oyster Creek contract 
at a time when the nuclear power industry was at a standstill. 
General Electric engineers expected to take a loss on Oyster Creek, 
but acted in the expectation that if two other such units could be 
built, the learning curve would lower construction costs enough so 
that General Electric could at least break even on three units. 
Westinghouse was forced to offer contracts at or near the Oyster 
Creek price by the competitive pressures applied by General Electric. 
But as construction proceeded, it became clear both to General 
Electric and Westinghouse that costs would far exceed original 
estimates, at which point turnkey contracts were withdrawn from 
the market. However, the effect of the turnkey period on utilities 
was to create expectations that non turnkey units would come in at 
costs near the turnkey prices, so that orders continued to come 
in for reactors even after the turnkey option was phased out. 
Whether intended or not, the turnkey era produced the kinds of 
results associated with a "loss leader" strategy, in terms of 
expanding demand for nuclear units. As it turned out, the 
nonturnkey units came on line six to eight years later at costs 
two to three times higher than turnkey prices, so that both the 
reactor manufacturers (on turnkey contracts) and the utilities 
(on nonturnkey contracts) suffered losses deriving from their 
overly optimistic expectations as to costs. 
The main problem with this story of the turnkey era is 
clear evidence that cost problems with the turnkey units stemmed 
largely from the post-turnkey period. The reasons cited for cost 
overruns by Westinghouse in Mooz' study were: (1) a dramatic 
change in labor costs (annual rate of increase of 30 percent 
from 1967 on versus a rate of increase of about 5 percent prior 
to 1967); (2) birth of the environmental movement; (3) increases 
in licensing costs; (4) decreases in labor productivity. All of 
these factors came to the fore only after 1966, that is, only 
after turnkey contracts had already been withdrawn. And there 
is no evidence of special sources of information available to 
General Electric and Westinghouse concerning these general economic 
trends that were not also available to utilities planning nuclear 
units. 
An alternative to the "loss leader" argument as an 
explanation for the growth in nuclear orders following the turnkey 
era is as follows. There are certain advantages to utilities from 
17 
18 
nuclear power that make it a desirable investment even if generating 
costs are slightly higher for nuclear relative to fossil fuel plants. 
First, there is a spreading the risk argument: given that a utility 
is already using coal, oil and/or natural gas units, adding a nuclear 
unit reduces the vulnerability of a utility to fossil fuel price 
increases or lack of availability. Second, nuclear is a high 
capital cost-low operating cost power source. Adding nuclear units 
increases the rate base of the regulated utility more than would be 
the case with alternative power sources and hence increases allowed 
profits for any given level of output. Third, at the time, nuclear 
power was regarded as a "clean" fuel, and hence would be less 
subject to problems of siting and pollution control. 
These inherent advantages of nuclear power were offset 
prior to the turnkey era by uncertainties as to capital costs and 
uncertainties as to the technical feasibility of large nuclear units. 
The reactor manufacturers had strong incentives to prove out the 
technology of large reactors in the mid-1960s. They did this, in 
effect, by engaging in privately financed demonstration projects, 
subsidizing the building of the turnkey plants. As construction 
progress was reported on San Onofre and Connecticut Yankee, the 
concerns of the utilities as to technological risks diminished. 
Moreover, by the end of the turnkey era, capital costs of coal 
plants were increasing at the rate of 15 percent or more per year, 
and there was a general expectation that coal prices would increase 
in the future, an expectation that was realized in the wake of the 
mine safety legislation of 1969. Finally, reported costs on the 
19 
turnkey units under construction (and on nonturnkey units such as 
Nine Mile Point) were favorable. The point is that there were a 
number of factors, over and above estimated capital costs of 
nuclear units, that encouraged utility investments in nuclear units, 
even after the turnkey era had ended. 
As noted earlier, capital costs to electric utilities for 
the non turnkey units contracted for in the immediate post-turnkey 
era were badly underestimated. But even in the face of those under-
estimates, it can be argued that, from hindsight, utilities going 
nuclear at that time might well have made the correct decision. 
Developments in alternative fuels, especially coal, acted in part 
to offset the underestimates of nuclear capital costs. 
It seems to us that the turnkey era can only be understood 
in terms of the distinction between technological risks and cost 
risks. While the reactor manufacturers had incentives to establish 
the technological feasibility of large nuclear units, since they 
could capture the rents from a successful demonstration program, 
the utilities appear to be in a better position to bear cost risks. 
Turnkey contracts are rare in the history of United States utilities 
for that very reason. As a permanent fixture of the contracting 
process, the price quoted for a turnkey contract would have to 
incorporateanactuarially sound insurance premium against cost 
increases. The withdrawal of turnkey contracts once utilities 
were convinced of the technological feasibility of large nuclear 
units can be interpreted as a return to the historical practices of 
the industry with the utility bearing cost risks, because self-insurance 
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against such risks was preferable to the "contingency" premium 
that would have been built into future turnkey contracts. 
There are several reasons for this. In the first place, 
the utilities are regulated monopolists, able to pass through cost 
increases to customers through rate increases, while the reactor 
manufacturers were operating in a competitive environment, competing 
with fossil fuel units and less able to absorb such cost increases. 
Moreover, there are moral hazard problems in turnkey-type contracts. 
The utility is interested in obtaining the lowest total cost of 
electricity possible for its base load plants, but a turnkey 
contract only provides a guarantee as to the capital cost of the 
plant. To the extent that there is the possibility of substitution 
between low capital cost components and low operating cost 
components, the incentives for the contracting firm under a turnkey 
contract are to opt for the low capital cost component. Thus there 
might well be sound economic reasons for a utility to prefer a 
nonturnkey contract to a turnkey contract, even if the capital cost 
of the nonturnkey unit is greater than that of the turnkey unit. 
We can of course only speculate on the forces that were at 
work during the turnkey era. One thing is clear, however; by the 
end of the era, the nuclear industry had established itself as a 
major force in the future development of electric power in the 
United States. 
THE COMMERCIAL SUCCESS OF NUCLEAR POWER 1966-1970 
As the turnkey era ended, commercialization of nuclear power 
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was an accomplished fact. In 1966 twenty plants were ordered, six 
on turnkey contracts. The remaining reactors, and almost all 
reactors ordered after 1966, were built by utilities under normal 
financial arrangements involving contracting with architect-engineers. 
During 1967, thirty reactors were ordered, but only one was on a 
turnkey basis. In 1968 and 1969 orders dropped off to fourteen and 
then seven reactors; by 1970 orders were back up to fourteen. 
Nuclear Costs in Contemporary Perspective 
Construction of the reactors ordered in 1966 and 1967 on 
a nonturnkey basis did not begin until at least twelve months after 
the orders were announced, because of time required for granting of 
various licenses. Consequently the initial surge of decisions to 
build nuclear plants occurred with little experience with construction 
of large nuclear reactors under normal utility contracting procedures. 
Nevertheless a mood of general optimism about total nuclear costs --
both capital and operating appears to have pervaded this industry. 
Electrical World (November 7, 1966) quoted Dr. Alvin Weinberg as 
saying that reactors ordered during 1966 would produce electricity 
at a cost of 25 percent less than that of coal, and in mid-1967, TVA 
Board member Frank Smith described nuclear power as having a clear 
but somewhat smaller advantage in the TVA area. 
There were, however, some warnings that turnkey quotations 
were unreliable bases for projections of nuclear costs. General 
Electric's annual report issued in 1967 stated that "earlier 
commitments made to win customer acceptance of the new [nuclear] 
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technology continue to affect earnings." Stephen F. Dunn, president 
of the National Coal Association, said that General Electric's 
annual report illustrated that coal was a more competitive fuel 
than turnkey prices implied (Electrical World, April 10, 1967). 
The trend in actual and estimated nuclear capital costs 
is apparent from Figure 1. Three time series are plotted in that 
figure: 
1. The average estimated capital costs of all plants 
ordered in the previous year, as reported by 
utilities to AEC/ERDA. 
2. The average of updated capital cost estimates for 
all plants still under construction during the previous 
year (and ordered in years prior to the previous 
year). 
3. The average actual capital cost of all plants completed 
in the previous year, using AEC/ERDA data. 
The same data are displayed in a somewhat different format in Table 4. 
Complete cost data on a plant by plant basis are provided in Appendix 
Table A-2. During 1966 and 1967, estimates of nuclear costs appear 
to have been based on the price quotations for turnkey plants. During 
1967 updated estimates of the cost of nonturnkey plants under 
construction became available. They indicated that actual costs 
would exceed initial estimates, but not by a large margin. 
FIGURE 1 
ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL CAPITAL COSTS 
1966-1976 
(Data missing on estimated costs for 1974) 
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Table 4 
AVERAGE ESTIMATED FINAL COST, $/kw, AT SELECTED POINTS IN TINE, FOR 
NUCLEAR UNITS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, 1965-1975 
NSSS Average Estimated Final Cost $/kw as of: 
Order Date 1/67 1/68 1/69 3/70 1/71 1/72 1/73 1/75 4/76 
1965-Turnkey 137 133 131 129 143 155 226 
Other 123 138 148 170 215 257 279 694 
1966-Turnkey 126 125 126 117 131 129 157 
Other 122 129 141 160 188 213 277 328 429 
1967 148 148 171 194 237 319 448 539 
1968 156 193 206 252 359 460 578 
1969 208 228 328 375 571 701 
1970 217 248 301 402 501 
1971 301 370 521 591 
1972 420 541 722 
1973 583 678 
1974 549 690 
1975 694 
Source: Central Station Nuclear Plants, AEC and ERDA, selected issues, 1967-1976 
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Estimates of the cost of newly ordered plants did increase 
from year to year between 1968 and 1971, rising from about $150 per 
kilowatt in 1968 to $220 per kilowatt in 1971. They rose more rapidly 
than interim estimates of the cost of plants under construction, but 
perhaps no more than sufficiently to incorporate the additional 
inflation that would affect plants with later completion dates. 
Licensing Delays 
Between 1967 and 1970, problems in licensing and constructing 
nuclear plants began to surface. With a total of 50 new commitments 
to deal with during 1966 and 1967, the AEC's capacity to process 
applications showed signs of strain. 
By the fall of 1967 licensing delays were apparent throughout 
the industry and, by the end of 1967, 26 plants were caught in the 
construction permit process alone. Table 5 reveals that the time 
required to obtain a construction permit for a reactor ordered in 
1968 was 14 months longer, on average, than it had been for a 
reactor ordered in 1966. Between 1966 and 1970, the situation 
worsened as the time required to obtain a construction permit (CP) 
increased by another 15 months. The actual distribution of time 
to obtain CPs is detailed in Table 6. 
During the 1966-1970 period, intervenors such as environmental 
groups, states, and municipalities, entered the licensing proc'ess. 
There were a few well publicized cases in which the activities of 
intervenors resulted in lengthening of the licensing process. 
26 TABLE 5 
1966 CP Application 
7/66 CP application 
7/67 CP issuance 12 months 
7/69 OL application 24 months 
5/73 OL issuance 46 months 
9/73 commercial status 4 months 
86 months 
(Average time, CP application to commercial, 7 years, 2 months.) 
7/68 
9/70 
3/73 
?/77 
?/77 
1968 CP Application 
CP application 
CP issuance 26 months 
OL application 30 months 
OL issuance 
commercial status 
Change from 1966 
(Months) 
+14 
+ 6 
(Average time, CP application to commercial, over 8 years.) 
1970 CP Application 
Change From 
1966 1968 
(Months) 
7/70 CP application 
12/73 CP issuance 41 months +29 +15 
1/76 OL application 36 months +12 + 6 
?/79 OL issuance 
?/79 commercial status 
(Average time, CP application to commercial, over 9 years.) 
Source: Status of Central Station Nuclear Power Reactors, Significant Milestones, 
ERDA-30, July 1976. 
TABLE 6 
REGULATORY TIME LAGS - NUCLEAR LICENSING 
I. Construction Permit Phase 
Time to obtain CP (months) 
Applied for CP No. of No. with CP Average Range 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 Other in year: units by 9/76 
1963 2 2 10.5 8-l3 1 1 
1964 2 2 10.5 9-12 1 1 
1965 4 4 7.5 5-10 4 
1966 16 16 11. 9 6-23 8 6 2 
1967 26 26 l3.5 7-28 2 23 1 
1968 l3 l3 27.2 16-59 9 1 2 1 (59) 
1969 11 11 23.5 8-41 1 5 2 2 1 
1970 17 16* 38.4 27-52 4 4 6 2 (52) 
4 no CP 1971 12 8 37.5 e 3 1 4 (60+) 
1972 6 6 29.3 18-45 1 3 2 
1973 29 18 25.5 e 9 7 2 9 no CP (39+) 
1974 42 7 26.2 e 2 5 35 no CP (27+) 
1975 8 -
- - -- - -
---- -_._---
* One cancellation. 
e refers to the minimum possible average for that year; i.e., by assuming that plants not obtaining CP by 
9/76 actually obtain CP in 10/76. 
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TABLE 6 
REGULATORY TIME LAGS - NUCLEAR LICENSING 
II. Primary Construction Phase - CP to Application for Operating License 
Time CP to OL Application (months) 
Obtained CP No. of No. applying Average Range 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 Other in year: units for OL by 9/76 
1963 1 1 29.0 29 1 
1964 3 3 23.7 20-26 1 2 
1965 1 1 22.0 22 1 
1966 5 5 20.4 13-24 1 4 
1967 14 14 24.1 13-40 8 3 3 
1968 24 24 26.3 8-66 2 5 9 7 .1 (66) 
1969 7 7 22.3 4-30 1 1 5 
1970 10 10 30.2 13-44 2 2 4 2 1 
I 
3 no OL I 1971 4 1 56.3 e 1 App (67+)1 
2 no OL , 1972 8 6 28.8 e 3 3 App (45+) 
1 11 no OL 1973 14 3 33.1 e 2 App (42+) 
1974 21 -
1975 9 -
-- --
~ 
-
-- -
- - -
~- .. -----.-
e refers to the m1n1mum possible average for that year; i.e., by assuming that plants not applying for OL by 
9/76 actually apply in 10/76. . 
N 
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TABLE 6 
REGULATORY TIME LAGS - NUCLEAR LICENSING 
III. Operating License Phase 
I 
Time to obtain OL (months) 
Applied for No. of No. with OL Average Range 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 Other OL in year: units by 9/76 
1963 - - - -
1964 1 1 23.0 23 1 
1965 2 2 19.5 16-23 1 1 
1966 1 1 11.0 11 1 
1967 4 4 29.0 25-38 3 1 I 
1968 8 8 21.1 20-42 3 1 3 1 
I 
18-61 1 3 4 1 (52) ] 1969 10 10 41.5 1 (61) 
24-69 1 4 4 4 1 (60) 1970 15 15 40.1 1 (69) 
1971 15 12 45.5 e 2 5 3 1 (60) 3 no OL 1 (67) (65+) 
1 no OL 1972 4 3 32.3 e 2 1 (47+) 
1973 5 2 - 2 
1974 5 - -
1975 3 - -
e refers to the m1n1mum possible average for that year; i.e., by assuming that plants not obtaining OL by 
9/76 actually obtain OL in 10/76. 
I 
I 
I 
N 
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TABLE 6 
REGULATROY TIME LAGS - NUCLEAR LICENSING 
IV. Operating License to Commercial Operation 
I Obtained OL Time - OL to commercial operation (months) No. of No. commercial Average Range 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 Other in year: units by 9/76 
1963 1 1 2.0 2.0 1 
1964 2 2 0 0 2 
1965 - - - - -
1966 1 1 17.0 17 1 
1967 3 3 19.7 7-42 2 1 
1968 - - - -
1969 4 4 7.5 4-10 4 
1970 3 3 5.7 4-8 3 
1 no com'l 1971 6 5 20.2 e 2 2 1 (58+) 
1972 4 4 6.0 0-9 4 
1973 12 12 2.3 0-13 11 1 
1 no com'l 1974 15 14 2.3 e 14 (29+) 
1975 3 3 .6 0-2 3 
_L- --- -_ -- -~---- 1-- _1--__ 1---
e refers to the m1n1mum possible average for that year; i.e., by assuming that plants not commercial by 
9/76 actually go commercial in 10/76. 
Source: Status of Central Station Nuclear Reactors - Significant Milestones, ERDA, September 1976. 
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However, there is clear evidence that a major part of the 
increase in regulatory delay was due to bottleneck problems involving 
the staff and the Advisory Commission on Reactor Safety (ACRS). In 
1966, uncontested applications could be processed in ten months or 
less; by 1970, it took a year and one-half or more simply to perform 
the staff and ACRS review preceding announcement of establishment 
of a licensing board and scheduling of prehearing conferences. This 
increase, it might be noted, occurred before the expansion of the 
scope of the CP review process to handle antitrust and environmental 
matters. No doubt a part of this bottleneck problem was indirectly 
related to intervention; it simply takes more staff time to prepare 
answers to issues that might be raised by intervenors in a contested 
hearing than would be the case in an uncontested hearing. 
Delays in Construction 
Licensing requirements were not, however, the only source 
of delay or of increasing costs. The Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy warned in 1967 that manufacturers might have problems in 
delivering equipment on time and in meeting performance and safety 
standards. To keep up with nuclear demands, in October 1968, 
General Electric announced major expansion of two manufacturing 
divisions (Electrical World, October 28, 1968). -Another NSSS 
manufacturer, Babcock and Wilcox, was reported to have problems 
in meeting delivery dates because of lack of capacity. 
One contemporary study found the following reasons for 
delays in bringing nuclear units on line: 
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l. Labor Trouble 28 plants 
2. Licensing Delays 25 plants 
3. Late Delivery of Pressure Vessels 21 plants 
4. Public Opposition 16 plants 
5. Construction Problems 16 plants 
6. Scheduling Problems 6 plants 
(Source: Electrical World, March 2, 1970). 
Labor trouble, late delivery, construction -and scheduling 
problems can all be interpreted as evidence of bottlenecks resulting 
from rapid expansion of damand for nuclear plants. Contemporary 
authorities recognized that equipment problems were epidemic, but 
favored the bottleneck hypothesis. The president of Westinghouse 
Power Systems, for example claimed that "much of the delay being 
experienced by some utilities is simply the result of the large 
influx of orders experienced in 1966-1967. Once this is behind us, 
plants should consistently come on line with five year lead time 
from order to operation." (Electrical World, September 1, 1970) 
The Relation Between Estimated and Actual Costs: 1966-1970 
Although licensing and construction delays were recognized 
in the nuclear industry, their full implications for nuclear costs 
didnot appear in cost estimates by utilities until after 1970. 
Between 1968 and 1971, estimates of nuclear capital costs were 
formed by utilities on the basis of historical experience: inflation 
and rising interest rates which appeared late in the sixties were not 
anticipated, delays were seen as largely a transitory phenomenon 
resulting from the great influx of orders in 1966 and 1967, and 
increasing the size of nuclear power units was expected to provide 
the economies of scale that had in the past been obtained by 
building larger fossil plants. It was not until 1972 and later 
that cost estimates begin to skyrocket in response to the observed 
fact that the 50 percent increase in estimates between 1966 and 
1970 fell far short of the trend in realized costs. 
The first published estimates of capital costs by the AEC 
was commissioned in March 1968, to be based on March 1967 data 
(WASH-I082). The study estimated that a 1000 MW plant would cost 
about $135/kw, a figure lower than 1968 estimates by electric 
utilities. The procedures used were seriously flawed -- the bill 
of materials was underestimated, the design of the plant was poorly 
defined, an unrealistically low interest rate was used, and zero 
inflation was assumed. 
In a second part, published in June 1969 (WASH-lISa), an 
attempt was made to determine the causes of the obvious increase 
in estimated cost. The WASH-lISa estimate of $250 per kilowatt 
actually exceeded contemporary utility estimates. The reasons cited 
for cost increases were: 
1. Higher direct costs, due to a revised description of 
the plant -- including additional safety systems --
and higher prices of factor inputs. 
2. Higher indirect costs (which included some construction 
costs), contingency reserves, and interest rates. 
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3. Escalation of construction and manufacturing labor 
rates. 
In January 1971 a new estimate of $350/kw was reported (WASH-1230). 
The increase was attributed to 1I1a test safety requirements, codes, 
and standards ••. , environmental protection and licensing criteria. II 
WASH-1230 also assumed an additional year of construction time and 
a higher interest rate. Utility estimates of nuclear costs lagged 
behind WASH-1230; the average reported for plants under construction 
in 1971 was only $300/kw. 
In Table 7 original estimates and actual realized costs 
of plants ordered in each year from 1965 to 1970 are compared. 
As Bupp (1974) has pointed out, not all of these plants have yet 
been completed, and estimates of costs for plants still in the 
operating license process when the data were assembled exceed the 
actual cost of completed plants. 
The 1965 and 1966 cohorts were completed at an average 
cost twice the estimate. Costs of completed plants in the 1967 and 
1968 cohorts range from two and one-half to three times the initial 
estimate, but it must be emphasized that these retrospective 
comparisons could not be made by utilities considering nuclear 
power plants in 1970 or 1971. They had only the historical 
experience of the utility industry with construction of fossil 
fueled power plants and four years of nuclear construction experience 
to rely on. Moreover, plants such as Connecticut Yankee and San 
Onofre had been completed on time and, to all appearances, under budget. 
TABLE 7 
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE INITIAL ESTIMATES TO 
ESTIMATED AVERAGE ACTUAL COSTS OF 
NUCLEAR PLANTS BY YEAR OF ORDER 
Estimated Average 
Year of Average Initial Cost of Plants 
NSSS Order Estimate Completed by 1/77 
1965 120 240 
1966 125 240 
1967 150 365 
1968 155 460 
1969 205 
1970 220 
Source: Central Station Nuclear Plants, AEC and ERDA 
1968-1976 
Estimated Average cost of plants completed by 1/77 uses 
WASH-1345 estimates of turnkey costs. 
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A TIME OF CHANGE: 1971-1976 
During the seventies initial estimates of the cost of newly 
ordered plants increased rapidly, from $200/kw during 1970 to almost 
$700/kw during 1975. The fact that information on the actual costs 
of completed plants became available at almost exactly the time that 
new estimates shot up (see Figure 1) suggests that utilities were 
learning from experience. From 1971 on, year to year changes in 
updated estimates of the eventual costs of plants under construction 
increased at about the same pace as initial estimates. 
But the actual costs of completed plants also increased 
rapidly during the seventies. During 1970 and 1971 many of the 
turnkey plants ordered before 1967 were completed; average reported 
costs in those years were about $125/kw. Through 1974 reported 
costs increased at an average of $50 per year. Plants completed 
in 1975 and early 1976 provided the real shock; the average cost 
of plants completed during 1975 was $425 per kilowatt, compared to 
$300 per kilowatt during 1974. And plants completed during 1976 
cost on average $560 per kilowatt. 
These changes in real -- as opposed to estimated -- costs 
resulted from changes in the regulatory process and from external 
events which changed the whole environment in which utilities 
operated. 
The Regulatory Process 
Events in the regulatory process tend to increase capital 
costs in two general ways. First, regulation can increase costs 
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through mandated changes in the design and construction of plants 
when regulatory guidelines are strenghtened or extended; such 
added costs reflect the substantive impact of regulation. Second, 
regulation can increase costs by imposing delays on the construction 
process, even when no changes take place in the design or construction 
of the plant; such costs represent the procedural effects of regulation. 
The most important procedural effects arise from changes in the length 
of time required to complete the licensing process. As that time 
increases, interest payments on prior expenditures accumulate and 
inflation drives up the cost of later procurements. 
Table 4 revealed that the length of time spent in 
construction permit-processes-alone was 29 months longer for a plant 
ordered in 1970 than for one ordered in 1966. The primary reason 
for licensing and construction delays from 1970 on was undoubtedly 
increasing attention to environmental and safety issues, much of 
which stemmed from intervenor activities in the licensing process. 
The Calvert Cliffs decision introduced a new dimension 
of environmental concern into licensing procedures. In 1971 the 
United States District Court ruled that the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 required the AEC to consider all environmental 
impacts of a nuclear plant in deciding to issue a construction 
permit or operating license. During 1971 the AEC began to 
implement this ruling, which required preparation of new environmental 
impact statements for all plants not yet in operation. By October 
1972, Electrical World estimated that 48 plants had suffered 
construction delays since the effects of Calvert Cliffs on 
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schedules had become apparent. 
Throughout the seventies the AEC issued increasingly 
stringent standards regulating environmental impacts and safety 
of nuclear plants under construction; additional delays resulted 
from AEC rulings which applied new standards to all nuclear plants. 
On June 15, 1971, Electrical World reported that five plants would 
be delayed in construction because of a new study of the Emergency 
Core Cooling System that would result in imposition of new 
requirements, adding $4 million to the cost of a typical reactor. 
Another example of a substantive effect of nuclear regulation is 
the estimated increase of $12 million in costs per plant for 
water intake structures, noise abatement measures, etc. mandated 
by the AEC in the 1971-1973 period. 
It should be noted that there is some evidence (Indian 
Point 2, Surry 1, Electrical World, May 1, 1972; September 15, 1972) 
that delays and costs of rebuilding nuclear plants 'were due to 
inadequate initial design, as well as to the regulatory requirements. 
During 1973 the AEC admitted that" •.. increases in 
reported power plants costs [have] continued to exceed expectations. 
Essentially all power plants under construction ... show large costs 
overruns ... " The AEC identified the causes of cost overruns as: 
1. Additional engineering. safety and environmental factors. 
2. Increased costs, of all types 
3. Increased escalation and interest due to longer project 
time. 
Responses to Changing Circumstances 
During the early seventies utilities became aware of the 
serious underestimation of costs in early expectations about nuclear 
power. 
From 1971 on, the year-to-year increase in cost estimates 
for new plants ranged from $75 to $150 per kilowatt. The average 
of reported costs showed a smaller annual increase, of $50 per 
kilowatt, until 1975. Interim estimates of costs of plants under 
construction increased at about the same pace as initial estimates 
(see Table 5 and Figure 1). 
Estimates of cost of plants ordered during 1975 reached 
an average of $700 per kilowatt -- a figure which will still be 
low unless there is a sizable fall in historical escalation rates. 
Despite the rising estimates of nuclear costs, orders 
for nuclear plants rose from 1970 until 1973, and then fell off 
precipitously as indicated in Table 1. As early as 1972 some 
cancellations and deferrals were, however, reported. Two factors 
can be identified as explanations for the surge of nuclear orders 
in the early 70s. First, air quality regulations made construction 
of fossil fueled plants appear expensive, infeasible, or at least, 
antisocial, in many areas of the country. Second, during the 70s 
coal-fired power plants -- the most attractive alternative to 
nuclear power given the limitation on oil and gas supplies that 
devloped after 1970 -- were also increasing in costs, and coal 
fuel prices were rising as well. 
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Table 8 presents data on coal and nuclear capital costs 
between 1968 and 1976 (1974 for coal). New nonturnkey nuclear units 
coming on line in 1972 had capital costs that were 70 percent higher 
than those for new coal units, with the differential reduced to 
roughly 50 percent higher in 1973-1974. While nuclear capital costs 
for units coming on line show a high rate of escalation (between 25 
and 30 percent per year over the past few years), there has also 
been a marked rate of escalation in coal capital costs as well. As 
noted earlier, due to the long and variable gestation period for 
nuclear units, data on units coming on line tend to understate the 
average capital costs for any cohort of plants, so that as dramatic 
as are the cost changes shown, in fact capital costs were escalating 
even more rapidly than indicated. Offsetting this was the increase 
in capital costs for coal, coupled with technological and cost 
uncertainties as to the new environmental controls (scrubbers, 
cooling towers, etc.) that were beginning to be applied to coal 
units. 
Moreover, after remaining almost constant for many years, 
coal fuel prices began to rise dramatically during the late sixties. 
At first the rise in prices was driven by increasing labor costs 
in coal-mining which resulted from new standards protecting miners' 
health and safety, The rise in coal prices played an important 
role in continued viability of nuclear power through 1973. Then a 
strike reduced mine output during 1973 at the same time that rising 
oil prices led some utilities to increase their demand for coal. 
A 300 percent increase in spot prices during 1974 resulted; many 
Number of Units 
Coming on Line 
Year Nuclear Nuclear 
Non-Turn Turn Coal 
1968 -- 2(N) 9(N) 
17(A) 
TABLE 8 
HISTORICAL CAPITAL COST DATA, 1968-1976 
NUCLEAR AND COAL POWER PLANTS 
Average MWe per 
Unit Coming on Line Capital Cost $/KW 
Nuc1 Nuc1 Nuc1 Nuc1 
Non-T Turn Coal Non-T Turn Coal 
--- 525(N) 344(N) --- 164(N) ll7(N) 
360(A) 132 (A) 
Range Capital Cost $/KW 
Nuc1 Nuc1 
Non-T Turn Coal 
---- 153- 72-
180 184 
1969 l(N) l(N) 13(N) 620(N) 550(N) 382(N) 262(N) 163(N) 140(N) 262 163 79- I 
17(A) 486(A) ll4(A) 192 I 
1970 -- 2(N) 13(N) --- 520(N) 488(N) --- 151(N) 157(N) ---- ll4- 83- I 
l(A) 10(A) 810(A) 472 (A) ll4(A) ll3(A) 161 205 
! 
1971 l(N) 2(N) ll(N) 812(N) 615(N) 693(N) 181(N) 170(N) 128(N) 181 101- 96- 1 
2(A) ll(A) 785(A) 507(A) ll5 (A) 120(A) 185 I 216 
1972 4(N) l(N) 7(N) 712 (N) 879(N) 665(N) 274(N) 121(N) 174(N) 143- 121- ll5-
l(A) 2(A) 14(A) 760(A) 701(A) 556(A) 143(A) 129 (A) 160(A) 353 136 244 
1973 4(N) 8(N) 765(N) 562(N) 293(N) 204(N) 161- --- ll5-
- ---3(A) 14(A) 873(A) 652(A) 184(A) --- 157(A) 393 307 
1974 4(N) 10(N) 8ll\N~ 565(N) 347(N) 230(N) 191 
. 136-
- 10(A) 914(A) --- ._-- ---5(A) 693(A) 320(A) 172(A) 546 312 
1975 7(N) NA 875(N) NA 436 (N) 251- NA 3(A) - 905 (A) --- 408 (A) --- NA ---518 
1976 3(N) NA 914(N) NA 560(N) NA 415- ~A - ._-- . --- ---692 
-
Number of units coming on line, coal, is the number of new coal units reported in Steam Electric Plant Construction 
Cost and Annual Production Expenses, FPC, 1968-1974. Nuclear units, non-turnkey and turnkey are from Central 
Station Nuclear Plants, AEC and ERDA, 1968-1976. 
(N) and (A) in the units coming on line columns refer to new plants and additions to existing plants respectively. 
Capital Cost $/KW, for coal, are FPC figures, 1968-1974; nuclear data are from FPC, 1968-1974, and from 
~entra1 Station_Nuclear Plants, 1975, 1976. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
I-' 
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utilities were cut off from coal promised under long-term contracts 
as suppliers diverted coal to the more profitable spot market. The 
importance of the oil embargo and resulting increases in all fuel 
prices goes without saying, of course. 
By 1975 coal prices had stabilized at a level about twice 
that reached in the mid-60s. Coal remained about one-half the price 
(per million BTU's heating value) of oil, and supplies were adequate 
to meet utility demand. 
On net balance, developments through the early 70s apparently 
favored expansion of nuclear capacity for baseload plants. But as 
early as 1972, there were indications that the rate of escalation of 
nuclear capital costs was beginning to tip the scales in favor of 
coal. 
In 1972, several utilities cited nuclear cost increases 
and construction delays as reasons for reversing earlier decisions 
and choosing coal over nuclear (Florida P & L, Iowa P & L). During 
1972 three nuclear units were canceled, one in favor of a coal fueled 
facility. During 1973 another reason for cancellations and deferrals 
became apparent -- rising costs and inadequate revenues were making 
utilities unable or unwilling to finance capacity expansion. On 
March 1, 1973, Georgia P & L announced deferral of two nuclear 
units because of financial strains resulting from denial of a 
request for a rate increase. Seven outright cancellations reported 
in 1973 were attributed, at least in part, to environmental opposition. 
In 1974 still a third reason for cancellations and deferrals 
became apparent -- the unprecedented slowdown in electricity demand 
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growth that resulted from rising energy prices, recession, and mild 
weather. Electrical World (September 15, 1974) stated that 
throughout the industry, "Rescheduling of generating additions 
approaches landslide proportions as U.S. utilities move to align 
capital expenditures with lower than expected load growth." 
Generating capacity was projected to grow faster than load through 
1976 despite announced cutbacks. 
Because of their high capital cost and long lead times, 
nuclear plants were particularly vulnerable to financing problems 
and cutbacks due to inadequate demand. Electrical World (October 15, 
1974) estimated that 36 percent of all nuclear units under 
construction had their schedules set back during 1974. A few were 
reported to be plants suffering construction delays, but most were 
reported to be victims of "utility ordered stretchouts averaging 
two years." 
As utility financial problems eased during late 1975 and 
1976, general construction plans recovered, but coal orders 
remained low while nuclear cancellations exceeded new orders. It 
is difficult to say whether this represents a temporary legacy of 
low demand and financial difficulties of 1974 and 1975, or a 
permanent shift away from nuclear power. 
CAUSES FOR NUCLEAR CAPITAL COST INCREASES, 1966-1976 
It might be well to place the cost history of nuclear 
power reactors in perspective through comparisons with other 
indicators for the 1967-1976 period. Table 9 shows that the GNP 
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Year 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1967-1976 
1972-1976 
TABLE 9 
PRICE INDICES AND INTEREST RATES, 1967-1976 
GNP Price Index 
(1972 = 100) 
Index % Change 
79.0 +2.9 
82.6 +4.5 
86.7 +5.0 
91.4 +5.4 
96.0 +5.1 
100.0 +4.1 
105.8 +5.8 
116.4 +10.0 
127.3 +9.3 
133.8 +5.1 
+69.4 
+33.8 
Construction 
Price Index 
(1967 = 100) 
Index % Change 
100.0 +1. 2 
104.9 +4.9 
110.8 +5.9 
112.6 +1.7 
119.7 +6.3 
126.2 +5.4 
136.7 +8.4 
161. 6 +18.2 
176.4 +9.2 
187.9 +6.5 
1967-1976 +87.9 
1972-1976 +48.9 
Net Yield 
Moody's Aaa 
Corp. Bonds 
5.51 
6.18 
7.03 
8.04 
7.39 
7.21 
7.44 
8.57 
8.83 
8.43 
1972-1976 
% Change in 
KWe Cost of 
Nuclear Units 
Coming on Line 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
+ 6.0 
+44.2 
+30.1 
+30.9 
+136.3 
Source: GNP price index, construction price index, and yields from the 
Economic Report of the President, January 1977; change in 
cost of nuclear units is taken from Table 8, except that data 
for the turnkey years(1968-1971) is excluded, and the 1972 
average cost ($/kw) excludes the two turnkey units completed 
in 1972. 
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implicit price index increased by 69 percent between 1967 and 1976, 
and the construction price index increased by 88 percent. Capital 
cost per kw for nuclear units coming on line rose by 136 percent 
between 1972 and 1976 alone; data for the early years are suppressed 
due to the known problems with turnkey reported costs. Between 
1967 and 1976, the interest rate on AAA bonds rose from 5.51 
percent to 8.43 percent, an increase of roughly 53 percent. 
If construction costs for nuclear units had risen at the 
average rate for the construction industry as a whole, and if interest 
costs (roughly 17 percent of total costs for a nuclear unit, 
according to WASH-1345, but now near 30 percent of total costs due 
to lengthened completion times) had risen simply to reflect the 
increase in interest rates, then the cost of a nuclear unit would 
have roughly doubled between 1967 and 1976 and would have risen by 
perhaps 60 percent between 1972 and 1976 rather than the 136 percent 
increase indicated by the last column of Table 9. The difference is 
accounted for by several factors: 
1. Nuclear units being built in the 1970s were different 
from those being built in the 1960s, because of new 
safety and environmental requirements. 
2. The time required to complete the licensing-construction 
process for new units coming on line increased from 
five years in 1967 to nine years in 1976, and will be 
even longer for units still in the pipeline. 
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3. Rising interest rates interacted with delays 
to increase interest charges. 
4. Because of bottleneck problems, labor and material 
cost increased much more in nuclear construction 
than in construction in general. 
5. Licensing costs rose substantially over the 
period. 
The leading study that has addressed itself to analyzing 
7 the relative importance of these factors is the study by Bupp • 
Bupp's work has been complemented by studies undertaken by the 
AEC, and by the utility industry and contractors. 
Bupp finds that one driving factor in cost increases 
was the increase between 1965 and 1975 in manpower and raw material 
8 
requirements of nuclear power plants. Bupp interprets this 
increase to be "obviously a consequence of more stringent nuclear 
safety and environmental design criteria," but asserts that the 
increase in reactor construction time is thought to be more important. 
Bupp divides total proj ect length into licensing time --
the time between application for and issuance of the construction 
permit -- and on-site construction time -- the interval between 
beginning of site preparation and operation of the reactor. He 
finds that "an increase in the licensing time has a strong effect 
on total costs" but that the relationship between total costs and 
on-site construction time is insignificant. 
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Bupp gives two reasons why increases in the licensing 
period might increase total costs: (1) the length of the licensing 
period measures the stringency of design changes and safety features 
that are required; (2) long licensing periods lead the utility to 
speed construction to make up for licensing delays, with consequent 
increases in costs. Bupp observes that this may also explain the 
lack of correlation between on-site construction time and costs. 
In summary, Bupp identifies the major factor behind the 
differential rate of increase in nuclear costs to be the activities 
of intervenors; he concludes that the nuclear licensing process has 
been used by opponents of nuclear power as a vehicle for raising 
the private cost of nuclear power to the perceived level of social 
cost. 
WASH-1345,9 published by the AEC in October 1974, represents 
an alternative approach to the nuclear cost issue. Rather than 
attempting to identify underlying causal factors, WASH-1345 undertook 
a retrospective study of cost increases between 1966 and 1974 by 
estimating costs, by categories, for nuclear units coming on line 
during those periods. Escalation of labor and material costs and 
increases in interest during construction were identified as the 
major components of cost increase between 1966 and 1974. In 
addition, the study found that direct construction costs more than 
doubled over the period, with about $90 million in cost of a 
hypothetical 1000 MW plant ordered in 1973 ($90/kw) being due to 
environment and safety related changes in plant design mandated 
between 1971 and 1973. 
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Because the approaches are different, there is no 
necessary conflict between these conclusions; and because nuclear 
units are so site specific in characteristics and so lacking in 
standardization, neither study can be said to represent a 
definitive answer to the question of the source of cost increases 
between 1966 and 1974. That licensing problems represent a major 
source of cost increases from 1970 on is clearly correct, and that 
bottleneck problems have been present throughout the history of the 
industry is also true. But the conclusion of Bupp's study that 
intervenors are to be assigned the major role in the explanation 
of cost increases deserves further comment. 
Intervention in the licensing process became the normal 
pattern from 1969 on; prior to that time, uncontested licensing 
hearings were as common as hearings in which intervenors appear. 
Table 10 gives data on construction permit applications between 
1966 and 1970. 
The average time required to complete the CP process 
rose from 10.5 months in 1966 to 37.7 months in 1970, and the 
percent of uncontested hearings drops noticeably between those 
dates. But the average time required for an uncontested hearing 
rose from 8.7 months in 1966 to 28.3 months for plants applying 
for a CP in 1970, which strongly suggests that intervention was 
not the only factor at work in lengthening the licensing time. 
Contested hearings, on average, required more time than did 
uncontested hearings; intervention is associated with time 
delays. But bottlenecks in the licensing process and changes in 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
TABLE 10 
CP APPLICATIONS 
1966-1970 
CP Applications Uncontested 
Avg. Time Avg. Time 
No. (Months) No. (Months) 
13 10.5 7 8.7 
21 13.2 10 l3.7 
9 22.8 5 16.0 
9 26.5 1 41.0 
12 37.7 3 28.3 
Contested 
Avg. Time 
No. (Months) 
6 13.8 
11 l3.0 
4 31.3 
8 25.0 
9 40.8 
Source: Status of Central Station Nuclear Power 
Reactors, Significant Milestones, ERDA-30, 
July 1976. 
49 
50 
rules and regulations unrelated to intervention also clearly played 
a role in regulatory delays, especially prior to 1971. 
It is instructive to look at the case histories of the 
units applying for CPs during this period, in an attempt to 
identify the causes of this increase in regulatory delays. Appendix 
B presents a capsule history of the CP licensing process for each 
unit entering CP licensing during the 1966-1970 period. It is 
arranged so that in each year, the units are ranked in terms of 
the delays experienced in obtaining a CPo It should first be noted 
that, in general, it is not easy to pinpoint the source of delay in 
any specific case. Intervenors can delay issuance of a CP by 
enlarging the scope of issues to be considered by a licensing 
board, thus increasing the number and time duration of prehearing 
conferences and hearings; but often those or related issues are 
also the subject of some disagreements among the staff, ACRS and 
the licensing board as well, and might have caused delays even in 
the absence of intervention. It is important to note that appeals 
after a CP has been issued, whether appeals to the ASLB or the AEC 
or to the courts, have no effect on delaying construction unless 
a stay is granted, a relatively rare occurrence. Thus there are 
many cases of very active intervention, involving many appeals and 
many issues, but with relatively short time delays in obtaining a 
CPo 
Some general comments are in order concerning the 
information presented in Appendix B. First, intervention is essentially 
never completely successful in the sense that a license is refused 
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by an LB. In fact, there are no cases of this occurring during the 
1966-1970 period, and none we are aware of in the history of the 
AEC-NRC. Second, intervention is rarely successful in the sense of 
changing the location of a reactor or challenging the safety and/or 
environmental features associated with construction; but there are 
a few cases in which licenses are conditioned to take into account 
issues raised by intervenors. Historically there have been cases, 
such as Malibu, where the conditions imposed were sufficiently 
restrictive so that the unit was withdrawn after obtaining a CP 
subject to such conditions. Thirdly, intervenors have been more 
successful (if that in fact is their goal) in increasing the costs 
of constructing a reactor, by imposing time delays and by imposing 
informational costs on a utility. A striking case of that is Bailly, 
a unit to be located near Dunes State Park in Indiana, which went 
through a long and bitter CP hearing, after which various stays have 
been imposed on construction through court actions. 
The primary success of intervenors has been generic rather 
than specific to individual plants. As indicated in Appendix B, 
contested hearings in 1966-1968 often involved the issue of 
"practical value" of nuclear units, with small utilities and 
municipalities attempting to intervene to force antitrust hearings. 
This led to Congressional action in 1970 mandating an antitrust 
review of all units entering the nuclear licensing process. 
Similarly, environmental issues raised in the later 1960s led 
finally to the incorporation of an environmental review as a part 
of the CP issuing process. No doubt antitrust review and 
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environmental review can, in certain cases at least, provide 
substantive relief to complaints of intervenors. But these 
reviews also increase the overall time delays associated with 
licensing and hence the cost of reactors, so that they also play 
a role in decreasing the economic advantages of nuclear power. 
The history of the 1966-1970 period was not simply one 
of intervenors entering the licensing process and automatically 
imposing delays on plant licensing. But after 1970 the success 
of intervenors on generic issues led to substantial cost increases 
to meet new design and safety requirements. Moreover, Calvert 
Cliffs led to major time delays in preparing environmental impact 
statements and in hearings on such statements. 
OPERATING COSTS OF NUCLEAR AND COAL UNITS 
Finally, some comments should be made about the total 
costs of generating electricity using nuclear units as compared to 
coal units. Cost-benefit analyses of nuclear units have typically 
assumed an 80 percent plant factor (output/capacity) for these 
base load plants, and the AEC has historically employed comparably 
high plant factors in its comparisons of costs between coal and 
nuclear. The higher is the plant factor, the lower are capital 
costs per unit of output, so that high plant factors lead to 
a more favorable cost comparison for nuclear units relative to 
coal. 
As early as the mid-60s, some utility managers were 
expressing skepticism concerning the assumption that nuclear units 
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could operate in the 80 percent range. 
A recent study found that capacity factors deteriorated 
with the increasing scale of new plants, as a result of equipment 
malfunctions and difficulty in effecting repairs. lO The deterioration 
was found to be so rapid that capital costs per kilowatt-hour generated 
actually increase with increasing scale above about 800 MWe. Komanoff 
also found that coal plants had somewhat better performance than 
nuclear plants when an optimum size coal plant is compared to a 
nuclear plant of optimum size (optimum being defined as the size 
at which capital costs per kilowatt-hour are minimized, with the 
reduced cost due to scale economies in construction being just 
balanced by the increased cost due to poorer operating performance). 
Komanoff's conclusions are based on a relatively small 
data base and are disputed by utility spokesmen and reactor 
manufacturers, who argue that the shakedown period for large reactors 
has not yet been completed in the reactors currently operating, and 
that higher plant factors and lower costs will be observed in future 
years. 
FPC data on nuclear and coal units coming on line between 
1968 and 1973 (presented in Table 11) indicate that while nuclear 
units have not met the 80 percent plant factor goal, nonetheless 
operating costs and total costs (including capital cost) per unit 
of output were less on average for nuclear than coal. 
Coal units coming on line in 1968 operated at a plant 
factor of roughly 55 percent between 1969 and 1974, while nuclear 
units of the same vintage had an average plant factor of roughly 
TABLE 11 
HISTORICAL OPERATING COST COMPARISON, 1968-1973 
NUCLEAR AND COAL POWER PLANTS 
New Coal Units Coming On Line In New Nuclear l;nits Coming On Line In 
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
~.9,,-Fuel Cost (mlls/kwh) Non-Fuel Cost (Mills/kwh) 
1969 .61 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 1969 .64 • --------- ---------
1970 .55 .56 --------- --------- --------- --------- 19701.02 .71 ---------
T<;71.71 1.01 .67 --------- --•. ------ --------- 1971 .76 .86 1. 2 --------- --------- ---------
j~l72 .61 .79 .60 1.15 --------- --------- 1972 1.02 .98 '2. 5 .51 --------- ---------
1973 .94 .99 .76 1.03 .93 1. 75 1973 2.60 1.53 2. 4 1.36 .93 .92 
Fuel Cost (~1ills/l,:'"'b) Fuel Cost (Mills/kwh) 
19~_ 2.65 --------- --------- --.. ------ --------- I 1969 1. 72 
Y 70 2.85 2. 56 --------- --------- --------- 1970 1. 66 2.32 .. -------- --------- --------- ---------
971 2.9tl 2.99 2.83 --------- --------- 1971 1.70 1.90 1.99 --------- --------- ---------
9723.26 3.31 3.16 3.20 --------- 1972 1.64 2.23 2.10 1.98 --------- ---------
973 3.55 3.68 3.56 2.97 3.63 4.00 1973 1.68 2.35 2.57 2.09 1.64 2.59 
~i 0 tal OperatlnJLCo~t.1Nills/k,",h) Total Operating (;o!jt (MiJ.lsL~w!l) 
1969 3.26 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 1969 2.36 --------- --------- --------- --------- ________ _ J'i70 3.40 3.12 --------- --------- --------- --------- 1970 2.68 3.01 -----____ _ ______ •. _ __..,______ _ _______ _ 
·i~;713.69 [ •. 00 3.50 --------- --------- --------- 1971 2.46 2.76 J.21 -------.- --------- ________ _ 
'J~12 3.87 4.10 3.76 4.35 --------- --------- 1972 2.66 3.21 4.26 2.49 -------- ---------
1973 4.49 4.67 4.32 4.00 4.56 5.75 1973 4.28 3.88 4.71 3.45 2.57 3.51 
Yiant Fact.or.: Output/Capacity Percent I Plant Factor: Output/Capacity Percent 
.\~(,'" ___ m___ _ ____ m_ -------- _m_____ ---------1'111 'r ------ --------- ------- ,'---------- __ m ___ _ 
1.,70 61 47 --------- --------- --------- --------- 1970 67 59 ---------
1971)) 5'3 65 --------- --------- --------- 1 8 '67 6r 
l\i72 62 59 67 42 --------- --------- 1972 78 77 ~4 64 --------- -------
-------_.- --------- ---------
---------- --------- ---------
-'Y7J--fl() 59 62 58 48 --------- i 1973 52 68 (,O 54 65 ---------
:~)t"l Output (Hill ion kwh) 1 Total Output (Million kwh) 
1'l69 6137 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 1969 6246 --------- ._-------- -------.- --------- ---------
'CiJO 6772 13766 --------- --------- ---------' --------- 1970 6597 5~q~ .-.. ------ --------- --------- ----------
J 9 71 6267 19873 9302 --------- --------- --------- 1971 7490 6762 (,285 --------- --------- ---------
1972 6861 2-3810 12435 19670 1369 --------- 1972 7112 7599 ';532 10153 --------- ---------
1973 6825 23229 11349 30660 4160 2661 1973 4692 7079 :;273 9446 11960 7189 
I~tnge-Total Operating Cost __ (Mills/kwh) Range-Total Operating Cost (Mills/~k~,",~h~ ____________________________________ _ 
1969 2.36-4.95 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- 1969 2.22-2.61 --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
1970 2.40~5.26 2.}7-3.65 --------- --------- --------- --------- .1970 2.60-2.74 2.77-3.51 --------- --------- --------- ---------'~171 2.46-5.72 2.68-6.99 2.06-4.98 --------.- --------- --------- 1971 2.28-2.70 2.49-3.18 2.7~ )[972 2.55-~3.15-6.00 2.10-4.77 3.10-5.66 4.45-4.55 --------- 1972 2.30-3.23 2.64-3.99 3.98-4.40 2.29-2.99 
1973 2.64-7.69 3.57-6.79 2.09-6.12 2.11-6.60 4.45-4.65 3.04-9.3211973 4.16-4.41 3.37-4.38 3.05-7.60 3.23-3.99 2.24~4.48 2.38-4.10 
No. of 
Units 5 6 5 5 2 4 
No. of 
Units 2 2 
Source: Steam Electric Plant Construction Cost and Annual Production Expenses, FPC annual issues, 1968-1973. 
2 3 2 
Data are shown only for new units for which no additions to capacity occurred between time of installation and 1973. Each unit ia weighted by ita 
output each year in arriving at average coata and plant factors. 
3 
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70 percent. In 1974, operating cost/kwh for 1968 vintage coal units 
was 5.87 mills, while for 1968 nuclear units, cost was 2.74 mills; 
and for 1969 vintage plants, the costs were 7.02 mills/kwh for 
coal versus 5.12 mills/kwh for nuclear. A similar operating cost 
advantage applies for later vintage units. 
The basis for the observed cost advantage for nuclear units 
is low fuel cost, which is not completely offset by higher capital 
costs for nuclear units than coal units. Using a 16 percent fixed 
charge rate together with the observed plant factors for coal and 
nuclear units of 1972 and 1973 vintage, total cost (mills/kwh) in 
1974 was 13.43 for 1972 vintage coal units and 12.49 for 1972 
nuclear units; total cost in 1974 was 18.42 mills/kwh for 1973 
vintage coal units versus 14.56 mills/kwh for 1973 vintage coal 
units. Thus as of 1974, the most recent year for which FPC coal 
capital cost data are available, new nuclear units were producing 
electricity more cheaply than new coal units. ll 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The use of average capital cost per kw as an index of the cost 
of nuclear units suffers from the problem of lack of 
standardization of such units. It is well known that costs 
can differ substantially on the basis of region of the country 
or whether construction labor is union or nonunion for example. 
Because the number of units coming on line each year is so 
small, major distortions can be introduced by such factors. 
For this reason both average cost $/kw and the range of costs 
are shown in Table 3. 
Also it should be emphasized that costs of units coming on 
line include dollars of varying purchasing power, since 
expenditures are spread out over a number of years. Moreover, 
the rate of increase in costs of nuclear units coming on 
line underestimates the "true" rate of cost increases, since 
for any cohort of plants, the cheapest tend to be those that 
come on line earliest, as pointed out by Bupp (1974). 
2. See H. Stuart Burness, W. David Montgomery and James P. Quirk, 
"The Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power," Social Science Working Paper 
No. 175, California Institute of Technology, August 1977. Also 
see "Development and Commercialization of the Light Water Reactor, 
1946-1976," Robert Perry, et aL, Rand Corporation, R-2l80-NSF, 
June 1977. 
3. There is some confusion in the literature concerning the number 
and identification of the turnkey plants. Mooz (1976) lists 
13 plants built by General Electric and Westinghouse, all 
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contracted for between 1962 and 1966, as turnkey units: Dresden 2, 3, 
Connecticut Yankee, San Onofre 1, Ginna, Oyster Creek, Millstone 1, 
Point Beach 1, 2, Robinson 1, Monticello, and Quad Cities 1, 2. 
ERDA lists an additional 12 units as turnkey, for a total of 25: 
Big Rock Point, Dresden 1, Yankee Rowe, Humboldt Bay, Peach Bottom 1, 
Pathfinder, Piqua, Genoa, Fort St. Vrain, Indian Point 2, 3, 
Northcoast Power. Of these, all except the last four were 
development reactors built before 1962, and Northcoast Power was 
later canceled. Further, in WASH-1345, Indian Point 2 is 
listed as one of 13 turnkey units but Connecticut Yankee is not 
listed as a turnkey. Generally, we have used Mooz' classification. 
4. While GE and Westinghouse ceased to offer fixed price contracts 
for nuclear units in mid-1966, both continued to offer fixed price 
contracts for nuclear fuel. Westinghouse's problems with its fuel 
contracts are well known; General Electric followed a less 
ambitious program, but for certain units (including Oyster Creek 
and Browns Ferry) guaranteed fuel price contracts for periods up 
to 12 years of plant operations were signed. The major difference 
between General Electric and Westinghouse was that General 
Electric followed the practice of covering its fuel commitments 
through forward purchases, while Westinghouse generally remained 
in an unhedged position. 
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5. Moreover, in Mooz' discussion of the turnkey era, an executive of 
Westinghouse is quoted to the effect that San Onofre "came in 
under budget on time, and made a good profit," while Connecticut 
Yankee "also returned a modest profit." In contrast, the 
WASH-1345 estimates show Westinghouse losing $91 million on these 
two units. 
6. This is a highly simplified version of Mooz' view of the turnkey 
era. The same viewpoint was expressed at the time by Philip 
Sporn, president of American Electric Power: "Competitive 
levels of nuclear plants may not be quite so low as initial 
announcement had seemed to indicate. One of the effects of 
competition might be to induce a manufacturer to risk somewhat 
greater uncertainty in the costs behind his turnkey price than 
might be tolerable repeatedly." (Electrical World, August 17, 
1964) 
7. Bupp, 1., Derian, J., Donsimoni, M., Treitel, R., "Trends in 
Light Water Reactor Capital Costs in the United States: Causes 
and Consequences," CPA 74-8, December 1974, Center for Policy 
Alternatives, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 
Massachsuetts. 
For a contrasting view of cost trends, see 1977 Update, Power 
Plant Economics, H. Brush, Bechtel Power Corporation, January 
21, 1976, and Economics of Nuclear Power, W. Davis, Bechtel 
Power Corporation, January 13, 1975. 
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8. Bupp estimates that the cost per kilowatt of plants completed before 
1975 increased at a rate of $49 per year when the effects of gross 
geographical and design differences between plants completed in 
different years are statistically controlled, and $27 when they 
are not. These estimates cannot be compared directly to Figure 1, 
because Bupp deflated all costs using the Handy-Whitman index of 
construction costs. We suspect that such deflation is inappropriate: 
the Handy-Whitman index is based, in part, on nuclear plant costs. 
Consequently, some cost changes which need to be explained vanish 
because of the deflator Bupp uses. 
9. Atomic Energy Commission, "Power Plant Capital Costs: Current 
Trends and Sensitivity to Economic Parameters," WASH-1345, 
Washington, October 1974. 
10. Komanoff, C., Power Plant Performance: Nuclear and Coal 
Capacity Factors and Economics, Council on Economic Priorities, 
New York, 1976. 
Komanoff's conclusions are critized on an item by item basis 
in "The Edison Electric Institute's Comments and Critique 
of the Council on Economic Priorities Report Power Plant 
Performance and its later Update," Edison Electric Institute, 
July 1977. 
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11. The nuclear units had, however, taken longer to complete. If 
substitute power were required because of nuclear delays, its 
cost could have reduced the nuclear advantage. Comparison of 
nuclear and coal units announced in the same year is impossible 
because of lack of cohort data on coal. 
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APPENDIX A 
CAPITAL COST DATA FOR NUCLEAR UNITS 
The two basic sources of information on capital costs of 
nuclear units are Steam Electric Plant Construction Cost and Annual 
Production Expenses, Federal Power Commission; and Central Station 
Nuclear Plants, AEC/ERDA. The FPC publication appears on an annual 
basis and covers all steam plants (coal, oil, gas, turbine, nuclear), 
while Central Station Nuclear Plants appeared monthly (through early 
1977), but is limited to nuclear units only. Data on capital costs 
appearing in the FPC publication are those reported by the utility 
to the FPC on a standardized basis that applies to all utilities. 
Data appearing in the AEC/ERDA publications are somewhat more uncertain 
in origin; most cost estimates are apparently supplied by the utilities, 
but in certain cases they represent estimates made by AEC/ERDA. personnel. 
Ideally, time trends in nuclear capital costs would be 
based on FPC data. Unfortunately, the FPC tends to be quite late in 
publishing its annual Construction Cost and Production Expenses volume. 
In fact, the latest to appear as of late 1977 was the volume for 1974. 
Given the brief history of commercial size nuclear units, using only 
FPC data would limit the analysis to only five or six years. Moreover 
when one adds to this that turnkey units dominate the picture through 
1971, only three years of reliable cost data would be available for 
an historical overview, not a particularly happy situation. 
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We decided to use AEC/ERDA cost figures for 1975 and 1976 in 
the tables presented in the body of this paper, which permits an 
extension of time trends up through 1976. We recognize that there 
might be distortions introduced into the analysis by the use of AEC/ERDA 
data to supplement the more reliable FPC figures, but there appeared 
to be no other alternative if any meaningful intertemporal comparisons 
were to be made. Appendix Table A-I presents a comparison between 
FPC data and AEC/ERDA data on a unit by unit basis for each year 
between 1968 and 1974, the years for which both data sources are 
available. It will be noted that differences exist for almost all 
units, either in terms of rated capacity, total capital cost, capital 
cost per kw, or in terms of the year during which the unit goes on 
line. Certain of these differences no doubt simply reflect 
definitional matters (e.g., for the AEC, a unit goes on line when 
it completes its commercial testing phase, while for the FPC, 
the date is related to the entrance of the unit to the rate base); 
while others arise from different reporting sources or the time 
at which the measurement is taken. It should also be pointed 
out that in the FPC tables, capital costs continue to increase over 
time even after a unit has come on line, reflecting various additions 
made to the unit after it goes commercial; hence there really is no 
such thing as "the" capital cost of a unit, independent of the time 
at which the capital cost is calculated. We have used the capital 
costs as of the year during which a unit goes on line as "the" capital 
cost of the unit. Moreover, the FPC tables do not give separate 
data on capital costs of additional units added to an existing unit; 
this must be calculated as the change in total capital cost for the 
plant between the year the new unit comes on line and the previous 
year. Unfortunately, there is no way to separate out the increase 
over time in the capital cost of the old unit from the increase in 
total capital cost due to the new unit. In Table A-I, any cost 
increase during the year a unit comes on line is assigned to the 
new unit, and this might account for a part of the difference 
between the FPC cost figures and those of the AEC/ERDA. 
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I 
PLANT 
1968 
--
T Connecticut Yankee 
T San Onofre 
Average 
1969 
--
NT Nine Mile Point 
T Oyster Creek 
Average 
1970 
--
T Dresden 2 
T Ginna 
T Millstone 
T Point Beach 1 
Average 
1971 
--
T Dresden 3 
T Robinson 2 
T Monticello 
NT Palisades 
Average 
TABLE A-I 
CAPITAL COSTS OF NUCLEAR UNITS 
COMING ON LINE, 1968-1974 
FPC AND AEC/ERDA 
FPC 
CaEita1 Cost 
MWe Total . $/kw MWe (Mill. $) 
600 91.8 153 575 
450 80.9 180 430 
525 164 503 
620 162.2 262 610 
550 89.9 163 530 
585 215 570 
810 92.3 114 809 
517 83.2 161 420 
662 96.8 146 652 1 
524 74.0 141 497 
628 138 575 1 
810 103.8 128 809 
769 77 .8 101 700 
569 105.0 185 545 
812 146.7 181 700 
740 146 681 1 
-CONTINUED-
AEC/ERDA 
Capital Cost 
Total $/kw (Mill. $) 
95.0 165 
98.0 228 
192 
151.0 247 
83.0 157 
205 
94.0 116 
65.0 155 
92.0 1 1411 
61.0 123 
1271 
100.0 124 
76.0 109 
89.0 163 
118.0 169 
139 1 
PLANT 
1972 
T Point Beach 2 
NT Vermont Yankee 
NT Pilgrim 
NT Surry 1 
NT Turkey Point 3 
T Quad Cities 1, 2 
Average 
1973 
NT Surry 2 
NT Turkey Point 4 
NT Zion 1 
NT Maine Yankee 
NT Prairie Island 1 
NT Fort Calhoun 
NT Oconee 1 
T/NT Indian Point 2 
Average 
-1974 
--
NT Arkansas Nuclear 1 
NT Arnold 
NT Zion 2 
NT Prairie Island 2 
NT Cooper 
NT Peach Bottom 2 
NT Three Mile Island 
NT Oconee 2 
NT Kewaunee 
NT Peach Bottom 3 
NT Oconee 3 
Average 
TABLE A-I 
CAPITAL COSTS OF NUCLEAR UNITS 
COMING ON LINE, 1968-1974 
FPC AND AEC/ERDA 
-CONTINUED-
FPC 
Capital Cost 
MWe Total $/kw MWe (Mill. $) 
524 7l.4 136 497 
514 172.0 335 514 
655 23l.5 353 644 
847 146.7 173 788 
760 108.7 143 693 
1657 200.1 121 1600 
708 188 693 
848 250.2 295 788 
760 122.5 161 693 
1089 276.0 251 1050 
830 219.2 264 790 1 
593 233.2 393 530 
481 173.9 361 457 
887 155.6 176 886 
1013 206.1 203 873 
814 251 753 
902 233.0 258 850 
566 202.2 357 535 1 
1098 289.9 264 1050 1 
593 172.2 290 530 
835 246.3 295 778 
1152 628.5 546 1065 
871 398.3 457 819 
887 320.8 361 871 
535 202.2 378 541 
2 2 1065 
2 2 871 
827 362 821 
65 
AEC/ERDA 
Cap:i,ta1 Cost 
Total. $/kw (Mill. $) 
54.0 122 
154.0 300 
120.0 186 
25l.0 319 
110.0 159 
250.0 156 
217 
149.0 189 
106.0 153 
262.0 249 
263.0~ 333 1 
200.0 377 
175.0 383 
163.0 184 
212.0 242 
240 
239.0 281 
277 .0 1 518 1 
27l.0 1 258 1 
200.0 377 
296.0 380 
537.0 504 
406.0 496 
160.0 184 
201.0 372 
226.0 212 
166.0 191 
329 
1Mi11stone is classified as a 1971 unit by AEC, and appears in 1971 averages; 
Zion 2 and Arnold are classified as 1975 units by AEC; Maine Yankee is classified 
as a 1972 unit by AEC, and appears in 1972 averages. 
2Not shown in 1974 FPC. 
T = turnkey, NT = nonturnkey. 
TABLE A-2 
CAPITAL COST ESCALATION -- NUCLEAR PLANTS, 1967-1976 
ESTIMATED CAPITAL COST $/KWe AT SELECTED POINTS IN 
TIME FOR ALL NUCLEAR P~~TS ORDERED 1965-1975 
Estimated Capital Cost $/KWe Estimated Capital Cost $/KWe 
Status Status 
Units Ordered In: 4/76 1/67 1/68 1/69 3/70 1/71 1/72 1/73 1/75 4/76 Units Ordered In: 4/76 J./68 1/69 3/70 1/71 1/72 1/73 1/75 ~/76 
1965 1967 
Pilgrim 0-72 100 104 136 192 183 183 183 Turkey Point 4 0-73 101 101 107 107 139 153 175 
Dresden 2 T 0-70 110 98 115 104 116 Bailly C;,1, 177 177 161 244 272 370 690** 1093** 
Hillstone 1 T 0-71 148 159 129 138 141 141 Three HUe Island 2 OIP 133 133 133 258 310 510 63;; 696 
IndLm Pt. 2 T 0-73 121 121 124 121 158 168 226 Prairie Island 1 0-73 175 175 175 175 245 349 377 ___ _ 
Turk0Y Pt. 3 0-72 97 101 101 107 107 128 159 Prairie Island 2 0-74 J75 175 175 175 245 349 377 
Turkey Pt. 4 Can. 87 CAN C E LED Ke,wunee 0-74 213 213 207 233 227 303 372 
Ft. St. Vrain 0-76 209 209 206 212 355 461 494 694 Zion 1 0-73 156 156 195 221 200 229 263 
Robert E. Ginna T 0-70 150 155 155 155 155 Zion 2 0-74 146 146 .185 203 200 219 258 
L;(.5 Aver.:lge 120 126 131 139 159 187 231 694 Crystal River 3 Dip 137 137 174 174 230.343 455 509 
196fi Pt. Beach 2 T 0-72 119 119 109 109 109 109 
Dresden 3 T 0-71 113 100 113 101 143 125 Maine Yankee 0-72 166 166 229 229 229 253 
Robinson 2 T 0-71 115 US 115 109 109· 109 Shoreham OfP 159 159 266 2fi6 26.6 377 849 349 
Palisades 0-71 107 139 127 157 169 169 Indian Pt. 3 0-76 165 165 162 226 265 328 415 ~08 
P~c-h 1 T 0-70 132 134 134 123 123 Oconee 3 0-74 94 94 94 121 123 155 187 
Quod Cities 1 T 0-72 126 126 123 109 131 125 188 Cooper 0-74 163 163 163 163 266 266 406 
OUi1d Cities 2 T 0-72 112 103 115 101 122 125 125 C:l]vert Cl iff<; 1 0-7';1 'if, 1 'if, LSL..l55_201 ?96 4.Q!. 1.14_ 
}lonticello T 0-71 157 157 1~7 163 H3 163 r."lvert niff", 2 ofP 133 133 131 111-151 24L2~3 l'IJ._ 
Browns Ferry 1 0-74 116 110 123 158 140 174 211 227 S_\lle-n 2 DIp 122 122 133"226 213 359 583 605 
Brmvns Ferry 2 0-75 116 110 123 158 140 174 211 227 251 Bell Can. 190 190 198 198 198 C A -:-:;- eEL E D 
O~onee 1 0-73 93 103 110 113 127 130 163 184 13rmm Ferry 3 olP 105 105 122 14,~ 174 211 227 246 
Oconee 2 0-74 93 103 110 113 127 131 155 181 D. C. Cook 1 0-75 Lll III III 13~ 227 201 377 .suo-
Vermont Yankee 0-72 171 171 171 259 259 300 300 n C. Cook 2 olP HI 111 III 13l 227 201 37r--uz-
Salem 1 DIP 126 142 145 133 226 217 367 596 619 R,.,Clver Vallev 1 0-76 -lc;2 192 223 1.27 259 __ ~99 __ 5~9 649 
Peach liottor,l 2 0-74 117 130 153 153 216 270 331 495 : Rancho Seco 0-75 168 168 168 161 267 - J71----.JoT- -3m 
PeadlB<lttom 3 0-74 117 117 136 136 208 247 297 212 ;L1merick 1 C 141 141 237 237 378 652 1138 1138 
Surry 1 0-72 125 166 183 212 212 258 309 Limerick 2 C 141 141 210 210 296 481 506 506 
Surr:t 2 0-73 125 138 143 158 158 177 189 189 No. Anna 1 olP 163 163 247 333 364 401 497 631 
Fitzpatrick* 0-75 133 n.a. 135 273 273 272 309 367 367 Millstone 2 0-75 176 176 216 221 289 341 432 502 
fort Calhoun 0-73 156 160 201 262 274 274 3:2 383 Hatch 1 0-75 191 191 192 234 240 359 466 480 
Diablo Canyon 1 OIP 142 145 145 145 191 191 302 366 461 St. Lucie 1 0-76 l40 140 154 151 254 398 452 593 
Three Mile Island 0-74 131 131 149 195 227 315 443 498 Nuclear 1 0-74 155 155 155 185 207 226 .268 
1966 Average 123 128 137 148 172 192 262 328 429 J.26LAverage 148 148 171 194 237 319 448 539 
T refers to turnkey plant. 
0\ 
0\ 
Status 
Units Ordered In: 4/76 
1968 
Verplanck 1 Can. 
Brunswick 1 olP 
Brunswick 2 0-75 
Carolina P & L Can. 
D. Arnold 0-75 
SC'luoyah 1 O/P 
-Sequoyah 2 o7p 
Susquehanna 1 C 
Susquehanna l C 
Nidland 1 C 
Nidland 2 C 
Fermi 2 C 
Seabrook Can. 
Diablo Canyon 2 O/P 
David Besse OIP 
Trojan 0-75 
1968 Average 
19"69 
Farley ] O/P 
Zimmer 1 OjP 
McGuire 1 O/P 
McGuire 2 OIP 
Forked River 1 C 
lIope Creek 1 C 
Hope Creek 2 C 
1969 Average 
1970 
Farley 2 O/P 
Nuclear 2 O/P 
Lasalle 1 C 
Lasalle 2 C 
Hatch 2 C 
-
TABLE A-2 
(Continued) 
Estimated Capital Cost ~/KWe 
1/69 3/70 1/71 1/72 1/73 1/75 4/76 
188 198 273 272 CANCELED 
158 197 197 222 220 328 401 
158 197 197 238 256 413 471 
158 200 200 CAN C E LED 
196 2tl4 286 279 394 371 518 
143 143 166 189 197 548 317 
143 143 166 189 197 548 317 
143 143 143 303 571 906 997 
143 143 143 303 571 573 646 
253 257 257 278 584 718 1528 
168 257 257 278 584 718 866 
136 197 223 292 391 458 R23 
122 216 CAN C E LED 
150 175 175 175 266 384 384 
150 231 231 305 400 479 588 
149 179 201 201 251 324 396 
156 193 206 252 359 460 578 
198 245 312 312 550 710 
243 262 354 384 536 617 
169 156 192 187 309 325 
169 156 192 187 309 325 
236 272 428 525 649 649 
223 264 416 530 n.a. 1172 
223 264 416 530 n.a. 1172 
208 228 328 375 571 701 
226 281 281 437 575 
189 217 250 349 453 
334 300 301 357 417 
278 300 301 357 417 
240 240 420 645 645 
----
-----~ .. -.-
Units Ordered In: 
~970JContinl1ed) 
Waterford 3 
North Coast 
San Onofre 2 
San Onofre 3 
No. Anna 2 
Watts Bar 1 
Watts Bar 2 
Bellefonte 1 
Bellefonte 2 
1970 Average 
1971 
Harris 1 
Harris 2 
Harris 3 
Harris 4 
Byron Station 1 
Byron Station 2 
Summit 1 
Summit 2 
Beaver Valley 2 
Crystal River 4 
Vogt1e 1 
Vogt1e 2 
Nine Mile Pt. 2 
GE 1 
GE 2 
Fulton 1 
Fulton 2 
Summer 
No. Anna 3 
No. Anna 4 
Hanford 2 
1971 Average 
Estimated Capital Cost $/KWe 
Status 
4/76 1/71 1/72 1/73 1/75 4/76 
C 197 197 300 400 638 
Can. lJL L4U L4U L4U CA~~Ll!.Ll!.U 
C 187 187 358 575 1038 
C 187 187 358 575 849 
OIl' 218 257 232 268 346 
C 192 267 277 291 332 
C 192 267 277 291 332 
G 196 266 296 404 397 
C 196 266 296 396 397 
217 248 301 402 501 
LWA 255 270 557 1001 
LWA 255 270 557 1001 
LWA 255 270 557 1001 
LWA 255 '270 557 1001 
G 350 348 443 466 
C 350 321 443 466 
Can. 390 /142 518 CANCELED 
Can. 390 :'42 518 CANCELED 
C 236 423 804 931 
Can. 301 CAN C E LED 
C 273 516 567 567 
C 273 448 438 488 
C 285 343 564 694 
P01;t 329 574 574 n.a. 
Post 329 383 383 n.a. 
Can. 348 351 582 CAllCELED 
Can. 348 351 562 CANCELED 
C 258 329 394 394 
C 291 359 437 720 
C 291 266 310 466 
C 253 391 510 720 
301 370 521 591 
-
0'\ 
'I 
Units Ordered In: 
1972 
Barton 1 
Barton 2 
Pilgrim 2 
Perq,: 1 
Perry 2 
Braidw'Jod 1 
Braidlvood 2 
~anicasse 1 
guanicasse 2 
Fermi 3 
Greemvood 2 
Greemvood 3 
Catalvba 1 
Catawba 2 
St. Lucie 2 
River Bend 
Clinch River LMFBR 
Grand Gulf 1 
-
- ----- ------
TABLE A-2 
(Continued) 
Estimated Capital Cost $/KWe-
Status 
4/76 1/73 1/75 4/76 Units Ordered In: 
1972 (Continued) 
CIP 500 651 1271 Douglas Pt. 1 
c/p 500 576 921 Douglas Pt. 2 
c/p n.a. 735 735 Atlantic Offshore 1 
LWA 409 512 642 Atlantic Offshore 2 
-LWA 409 512 642 Seabrook 1 
C n.a. 446 479 Seabrook 2 
C n.a. 446 479 SCED/HTGR 1 
Can. 522 CANCELED SCED/HTGR 2 
Can. 522 CAN C E LED Hartsville 1 
Can. 410 605 CANCELED Hartsville 2 
c/P 403 611 611 Hartsville 3 
elP 403 611 611 Hartsville 4 
C 269 432 470 Camanche Park 1 
C 269 432 470 Camanche Park 2 
LWA 320 662 765 Surry 3 
LWA 638 637 637 Surry 4 
1748 4960 5571 Nuclear Project 1 
C 515 525 560 Grand Gulf 2 
Estimated Capital Cost $/KWe 
Status 
11/76 1/73 1/75 4/76 
C/I' . 398 594 1002 
CII' 398 594 781 
c/l' 4'30 541 1087 
ell' 430 541 1087 
<:/1' 386 507 507 
ctl' 386 473 473 
Can. 606 CAN C E LED 
Can. 606 CAN C E LED 
c/p 310 315 488 
ell' 310 315 488 
e/p 320 315 488 
elP 320 315 483 
C 320 309 309 
C 320 309 309 
C 325 611 1251 
C 325 375 891 
C 473 530 942 
C 515 457 560 
420 541 722 1972 Average 
------ -------~- -----
0' 
00 
TABLE A-2 
(Continued) 
Estimated Capital Cost $/KWe 
Status 
Units Ordered In: 4/76 1/75 
1973 
Palo Verde 1 c/P 495 
Palo Verde 2 clP 473 
Palo Verde 3 C/P 489 
Perkins I c/p 581 
Perkins 2 c/p Sill 
Perkins 3 c/P 581 
Cherokee c/p 583 
Cheroke" ? clP 583 
Cherokee 3 c/P 583 
Blue Hills 1 c/p 659 
River Bend 2 LWA 545 
Allen's Creek 1 c/P 545 
Allen's Creek 2 c/p 545 
South Texas 1 C 460 
South Texas 2 C 460 
Clinton 1 C 466 
Clinton 2 C 393 
Wolf Creek c/p 817 
Jamesport 1 e/P 698 
Ni1lstone 3 C 555 
Tyrone 1 e/P 783 
Pebble Ser1ngs 1 e/P 511 
Atlantic 3 
--
609 
Atlantic 4 -- 609 
Black Fox 1 e/P 421 
Black Fox· 2 e/P 421 
Skagit 1 e/p 705 
Sterling e/P 698 
Davis-Besse 2 LWA 667 
Davis-Besse 3 LWA 780 
Callaway 1 Ll,A 749 
Callaway 2 tWA 719 
Koshkonong 1 rip 572 
Koshkonong 2 c/p 474 
Nuclear Project 3 c/P 600 
1973 Average 583 
*Reclassified by AEC as a 1960 plant in 1970. 
**Construction halted under court order. 
4/76 Units Ordered In: 
1974 
788 Barton 3 
683 Barton 4 
767 South River 1 
663 South River 2 
663 South River 3 
6('3 Central Maine Power 
672 Zimmer 2 
672 Blue Hills 2 
672 Iowa P & L 
659 Jamesport 2 
545 St. Rosalie 1 
528 St. Rosalie 2 
528 NEES 1 
541 NEES 2 
541 Hontague 1 
756 Mcntague 2 
647 Ft. Calhoun 2 
817 Pebble Springs 2 
882 Cementon 
874 Marble Hill I 
783 Marble Hill 2 
710 Skagit 2 
609 Yellow Creek 1 
609 Yellow Creek 2 
348 Phipps Bend 1 
348 Phipps Bend 2 
771 Nuclear Project 4 
696 Nuclear Project 5 
746 1974 Average 
854 1975 
714 South Dade 1 
670 South Dade 2 
722 Sundesert 1 
722 Sundesert 2 
1000 1975 Average 
678 
Estimated Capital Cost $/KWe 
Status ~ 
4/76 1/75 4/76 
Can. 610 CANCELED 
Can. 628 CANCELED 
-- n.a. n.a. 
--
n.a. n.a. 
-- n.a. n.a. 
--
667 696 
-- 427 946 
C/P 558 558 
Can. 700 CANCELED 
C/P 632 802 
Can. 517 CANCELED 
Can. 517 CANCELED 
-- 693 687 
-- 693 687 
c/p 561 697 
c/p 561 626 
c/p 671 775 
c/p 595 595 
c/p 603 672 
c/p 522 658 
c/p 522 549 
C/? 556 559 
-- 346 715 
--
356 715 
c/p 346 633 
c/P 346 633 
LWA 521 900 
c/P 573 1023 
549 690 
--
577 820 
-- 577 778 
--
572 
--
572 
694 
[Status 4/76: --, no application for construction permit; LWA-- limited work authorization while construction permit pending; 
C/P -- construction permit pending; C -- construction permit granted; olP -- operating permit pending; 0 -- (date) -- operating 
permit granted, commercial operation of (date)]. 
Averages per year are average capital cost per KWe for plants. not yet in commercial operation. 
Source: "Central Station Nuclear Plants," ERDA, selected issues, 1968-1976. 
0\ 
\0 
Unit 
Fort St. Vrain 
Salem 1 
Vermont Yankee 
Turkey Point 3, 
Oconee 1, 2 
Point Beach 1 
Monticello 
Browns Ferry 1, 
Palisades 
Robinson 2 
Quad Cities 1 
Dresden 3 
Quad Cities 2 
4 
APPENDIX B 
DELAYS IN THE ISSUANCE OF CP FOR UNITS APPLYING FOR CP, 1966-1970 
A. Units Applying for CP in 1966 
Time To 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
23 Yes First large gas cooled reactor. Delay due to time required for staff and ACRS reports. 
21 Yes Delay due to change in plant site after initial application. 
13 Yes Delay due in part (4-5 months) to intervenors (environmental issues). 
13 Yes Delay due to ACRS and staff reports. CP 
contains condition raised by intervenor. 
12 Yes Three months delay due to intervenor ("practical value" issue). 
11 Yes No delay due to intervenor. 
First field erected pressure vessel; not a 
10 No source of delay 
2 10 No ACRS delays CP by two months -- diesel generator system 
9 No No problems. 
9 No No problems. 
9 No First case involving multiple units at one 
site; not a source of delay 
8 No No problems. Identical to Dresden 2, already 
under construction. 
6 No See Quad Cities 1. 
"'-J 
o 
Unit 
Indian Point 3 
Zion 1 
Zion 2 
Surry 1, 2 
Diablo Canyon 
Prairie Island 1, 2 
Cook 1, 2 
Pilgrim 
Fort Calhoun 
Crystal River 
Maine Yankee 
Ark. Nuclear 1 
3 Mile Island 
Kewaunee 
Point Beach 2 
Browns Ferry 3 
Peach Bottom 2, 3 
Cooper 
APPENDIX B 
(Continued) 
B. Units Applying for CP in 1967 
Time To 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
22 months from application to notice of 
28 Yes hearing. Safety issues raised by intervenors. 
Appeals,CP affirmed. 
ACRS concern with population density; staff-LB 
17 No differences on safety issues, ownership of 
16 No Commonwealth Edison. Appeal on ownership issue, 
CP affirmed by AEC. 
15 No 13 months from application to notice of hearing. No problems. 
15 Yes Seismicity issue raised; no problems due to intervenors 
Safety issues raised; no delays due to 
15 Yes intervenor (application changed from 1 to 2 
units). 
15 No No apparent problems - 12 months for ACRS, 
staff reports. 
14 Yes "Practical value" intervenors - some accepted, 
some denied standing. Appeals, denied 
14 No Staff-LB differences. CP is conditioned. AEC later rejects conditions. 
"Practical value" raised. CP is conditioned, 
13 Yes but no apparent delays due to intervenors. 
Appealed,CP affirmed 
"Practical value" intervenors denied standing. 
13 No Problem with financial qualifications of 
applicant, OK'd two years later. 
13 No Uncontested. No problems. 
12 Yes Uncontested. Proximity to airport a minor problem. 
12 Yes Uncontested. No problems. 
12 Yes Uncontested. No problems 
12 No No problem. 
11 Yes "Practical value" intervenors, no delay. Appealed,CP affirmed. 
11 No Several amendments filed prior to hearing, but 
no delay problems with them. 
"-J 
.... 
Unit 
Rancho Seco 
Salem 2 
Oconee 3 
Unit 
Shoreham 
Diablo Canyon 2 
3 Mile Island 2 
Brunswick 1, 2 
Arnold 1 
Time To 
APPENDIX B 
(Continued) 
B. Units Applying for CP in 1967 
(Continued) 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
11 No LB notes that if there had been intervenor, 
more complete staff study would have been needed. 
11 Yes Intervenor issues related to OL not CPo No problems. 
7 Yes "Practical value" intervenors denied standing. Various ~~eals, all denied. 
C. Units Applying for CP in 1968 
Time To 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
Intervenor objects to ASLB's application of NEPA, 
raises bias issue, claims work being done without 
59 Yes CP, raises freedom of information issues, various 
appeals to ASLAB, all rejected. Length of time 
related to NEPA FES requirements. 
17 months from CP application to notice of 
hearing. Delays in hearings due to seismic 
issues. NEPA issues raised by intervenors. 
30 Yes Appealed, CP affirmed even though by time of AB decision, procedures have changed. On second 
appeal (1973) results in conditions on CP, 
several issues raised by intervenor, suspension 
of some construction. 
19 No Uncontested. 16 months from CP application to 
notic.e of hearinJS. 
"Practical value" intervention denied. Appeal, 
19 No denial (at CP stage) affirmed. (five month 
suspension of construction for NEPA reasons 
occurs from 11/71-4/72). 
3 month delay relating to financial qua1ifica-
19 Yes tions of applicant; involved a dispute with REA. 
Reviewed and affirmed by AB. 
--
--..J 
N 
Unit 
Sequoyah 1, 2 
Calvert Cliffs 1, 2 
Fitzpatrick 1 
Hatch 1 
Unit 
Midland 1, 2 
Fermi 2 
Farley 1 
APPENDIX B 
(Continued) 
C. Units Applying for CP in 1968 
(Continued) 
Time To 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
15 months for staff safety evaluation. 
19 No Uncontested. First CP since NEPA passed, 
No major delays due to NEPA. 
Safety issues raised by intervenors rejected. 
18 Yes Appealed, CP affirmed by AEC. (Environmental 
court case occurs after CP issuance.) 
17 No No problems, except coordination with state 
agency re~ardin~ releases into Lake Ontario. 
16 No Uncontested. No problems. 
D. Units Applying for CP in 1969 
Time To 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
Safety issues raised by intervenor, led into 
freedom of information appeals, rej ec ted by AB, 
claim construction occurring before CP issuance 
rejected by AB, also rejected by AEC, various 
47 Yes other motions denied by AB. Delays apparently 
due to intervenors. CP appealed, affirmed. 
Bias of LB claimed, denied. Petition to 
strengthen quality assurance during construction 
denied. 
Uncontested. 24 months from CP application to 
notice of hearing. Reviewed by AB because of 
41 No discrepancies between staff and LB on "as low as practicable" calculations. CP affirmed after 
lecture to LB on resolving such issues at CP 
hearing. 
First case involving an environmental hearing 
pursuant to NEPA, Calvert Cliffs decision. 21 
months from CP application to notice of hearing. 
34 Yes Intervenors raised need for power and environ--
mental issues. All rej ected, monitoring of 
weather and noise data required of applicant. 
No appeals. 
-...J 
W 
Unit 
North Anna 1, 2 
Millstone 2 
Davis Besse 1 
Trojan 
St Lucie 1 
Beaver Valley 1 
Time To 
APPENDIX B 
(Continued) 
D. Units Applying for CP in 1969 
(Continued) 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
Environmental issues raised, dismissed as 
23 Yes beyond AEC scope. CP later conditioned to 
meet NEPA conditions. 
CP issued with condition requiring compliance 
20 Yes with state and federal environmental standards. Environmental issues raised by intervenors are 
rejected. Appealed, CP affirmed by AB. 
"Practical value" intervenors denied standing. 
Appeal, affirmed. Bias issue raised, rejected 
by AEC, safety issues, environmental issues, 
meteorological issues raised and rejected. 
20 Yes Appeal, CP affirmed. Stay of construction 
petition denied by AB. 4/72, court orders 
hearing on stay for NEPA review. Hearing held, 
stay again denied. Appealed to AEC, again 
stay denied. 
Environmental issues and "as low as practicable" 
safety issues raised by intervenors. 14 months 
20 Yes from CP application to notice of hearing. LB 
rejects intervenor contentions. Appealed, CP 
affirmed. 4/72, petition for stay of construc-
tion for NEPA review. Intervenors and applicant 
reach agreement before hearing on petition. No 
stay of construction. 
Compromise with one intervenor on use of river 
water before hearing, intervenor withdraws. 
18 Yes State of Florida accepts an agreement to obey 
environmental laws of the state. Staff appeals 
on the basis of the language of this condition. 
AB accepts staff recommendation. 
Uncontested decision. 16 months CP application 
17 Yes to prehearing conference. Only problem is staff 
recommendation for second containment structure. 
-.,J 
~ 
Unit 
Northcoast Power 
Hope Creek 1, 2 
Limerick 1, 2 
Waterford 3 
Bailly 
San Onofre 2. 3 
APPENDIX B 
(Continued) 
E. Units Applying for CP in 1970 
Time To 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
- - Withdrew after CP application. 
21 months from CP application to establishment 
of LB. Site changed during CP process. New 
57 Yes LB appointed 47 months after CP application. 
Intervenors withdraw before CP hearing on basis 
of agreement with applicant. 
21 months from CP application to notice of hear-
51 Yes ing. Delay of licensing for 13 months due to 
environmental hearing. Intervenor raised safety 
issues, seismic, quality assurance, water supply. 
CP conditioned to require EIS on water reservoir. 
"Practical value" intervention permitted. 
Procedural delays associated with individual 
47 Yes intervenor. Anti-trust a major issue. Safety 
and environmental issues raised at CP hearing, 
intervenor items rejected by LB. CP includes 
conditions relating to anti-trust issues. 
Reviewed by AB and affirmed. 
13 months from CP application to establishment 
of ASLB. Issues raised by intervenors, appealed 
to AB and AEC and rejected, including intimida-
45 Yes tion of one of intervenors witnesses, bias, 
quorum problems, freedom of information, new 
evidence. Intervenors obtain temporary stay 
of CP, condition on CP. Case taken to circuit 
court. CP reopened 10/74 because of court 
decision. No substantive changes in CPo 
Several prehearings and hearings (8 months 
between first prehearing and final hearing). 
Safety, seismic issues raised. LB rules 
underground siting not feasible as a 
41 Yes practical alternative. CP issued with several 
conditions. Later, 1/74, California Coastal 
Commission bans construction; 2/20/74, 
construction permitted subject to conditions. 
AB rejects intervenor petition that AEC continue 
California ban on construction. 
------~ 
-
...... 
l.n 
Unit 
Forked River 1 
LaSalle 1, 2 
Zimmer 1 
McGuire 1, 2 
Hatch 2 
Ark. Nuclear 2 
Farley 2 
Time To 
APPENDIX B 
(Continued) 
E. Units Applying for CP in 1970 
(Continued) 
Obtain CP Intervenors Comments 
Uncontested. 26 months from CP application to 
37 Yes establishment of ASLB. New Jersey wants a 
condition in CP making New Jersey air pollution 
code binding. Rejected by LB. 
Environmental issues; LB includes monitoring 
requirements in CPo AB and AEC review the CP 
decision, find quality assurance problems. 
34 Yes Applicant changes QA organization so that no 
stays or further conditions imposed on CPo 
Applicant succeeds (at AB level) in disqualify-
ing one member of LB. 
Uncontested. 23 months from CP application to 
notice of hearing. AB remands the case because 
29 No of inadequate record relative to cooling tower, 
no stay of construction. LB heard additional tes-
timony and recommended no change. AB af firms CP. 
"Practical value intervenors denied standing. 
29 Yes 233 items introduced by remaining intervenors; 
all are rejected by staff and LB. 
Uncontested. 24 months from CP application to 
notice of hearing. Essentially identical to Unit 
29 No 1 under construction. 16 amendments to PSAR 
during staff review. Monitoring requirements 
included as condition of CPo No anneals. 
27 No Uncontested. Staff appeals condition attached to CPo AB affirms LB's condition. 
"Practical value" and environmental issues. 
26 Yes Exemption granted by LB to begin construction 
16 months before CP issued. 
..... 
(J\ 
Year of 
Suspension 
or 
Cancellation 
(1) 1970 
(1) 1971 
(5) 1972 
(5) 1973 
(11) 1974 
16) 1975 
110) 1976 
(8) 1977 
APPENDIX C 
SUSPENDED OR CANCELED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS BETWEEN 
1970-1977 WITH OUTSTANDING NSSS ORDER 
Reactor Name Owner Supplier 
Malibu LADWP W 
Unit 4 Carolina P & L GE 
Bell NYSGE GE 
Verplanck 1 & 2 Consolidated Edison GE 
Waterford 4 Louisiana P & L W 
Crystal River 4 Florida Power 
Aguirre PRWRA W 
Mendocino I & 2 PG & E GE 
Perryman 1 & 2 Baltimore Electric Comb. 
Vogtle 1 & 2 Georgia Power W 
Quanicasse 1 & 2 Consolidated Power W 
Vidal I & 2 SCE GA 
Fermi 3 Detroit GE 
Tyrone 2 Northern States Power W 
Boardman Portland B & W 
Off Shore 1 & 2 Jacksonville E.A. OPS 
Fulton 1 & 2 Philadelphia Electric GA 
AlIens Creek 1 & 2 Houston Lt&ht and Power GE 
St. Rosalie 1 & 2 Louisiana GA 
Summit 1 & 2 Delmarva GA 
Barton 1 & 2 Alabama GE 
Barton 3 & 4 Alabama GE 
NORCO-NP-l PRWRA W 
Unit 2 & 3 Florida Power Comb. 
Iowa Power and Light GE 
Douglas Point Potamac Electric Power GE 
Surry 3 & 4 Virginia Electric Power B & W 
Sears Island Central Maine W 
South Dade 1 & 2 Florida P & L W 
Vandalia Iowa Power B & W 
Year of 
NSSS 
Order 
63 
68 
67 
68 & 69 
70 
71 
70 
71 
72 
71 
72 
72 
72 
73 
73 
74 
71 
73 
74 
71 
72 
74 
74 
74 
74 
72 
72 
74 
75 
76 
Source: Electrical World, 1965-1977, U.S. Central Station Nuclear Electrical Generation Units: 
Significant Milestones, 1965-1977. 
Tables in this appendix were prepared by Katsuaki Terasawa, Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 
--..j 
--..j 
-Year of Number 
NSSS of 
Order Order 
70-71 
65 7 .6 
66 21 .6 
67 31 .4 
68 16 1.0 
69 8 .4 
70 IS .3 
71 21 
72 38 
73 37 
74 33 
75 4 
76 3 
77 
APPENDIX C 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
DELAYS IN EXl'ECTED COMMERCIAL OPERATION DATE 
BETWEEN 1970-1977 
Average Delay In 
-
71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 75-76 76-77 
• L. .5 I... 1.0 1.0 2.0 
,... -.. 
.5 .3 .5 .5 .8 _ .4 1-------III _.::;. .7 .5 .7 .6 • .8 0 
11.4 .5 !- ••• . ---.6 .9 .5 0 
.9 I 1.0 .8 .9 1.0 .1 
1.0 .5 .5 ,t .7 .5 .1 
.3 .5 1.6 1.9 I .7 .4 
.2 1.0 1.1 .7 .5 
.9 .7 .8 .8 
-
1.8 1.0 1.2 .1 
-1.5 .5 
2.0 
- -
-- -_.- -_.-
Number of Average Length 
Ranges in Plants (Yrs.) of Approval 
Annual Suspended Since NSSS Order 
Delays or 
Canceled CP OL 
0-5 0 1.5 6 
0-5 1 1.5 6 
0-8 1 2.5 8 
1-8 2 3.0 
2-9 1 3.5 
2-7 2 3.5 
3-11 9 4.0 
1-8 13 
1-8 4 
1-9 11 
(1)-1 2 
0-2 1 
Source: Electrical World, 1965-1977, U.S. Central Station Nuclear Electrical Generation Units: Significant Milestones, 1965-1977. 
Note: For each year entries to the left of the solid line reflect delays in CPo Entries to the right of the broken line indicate 
delays after OL has been issued. The entries bordered by the broken and solid line reflect delays after CP is issued . 
but prior to OL issuance. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITS ORDERED IN 1966 
n <: 0 n <:on <or. < 0 n < 0 n <: 0 n <:0 n < 0 0 ,... ro 0 1-" ro 0 1-'- II> 0 1-'- ro 0 1-'- ro 0 1-'- ro 0 I-'-ro 0 1-" ro § ~ "0 (fJ ...... § ~ "0 (IJ I-' § ~ "0 (IJ I-' § /:'j "0 (IJ ..... ;2 "0 (f) ..... i!l /:'j "0 (f) ..... § ~ "0 tn ..... § /:'j "0 tn ..... (~. I Pl II> I III ro I III ro I III ro I III ro I III ro I III ro I III ro'O t"1 Pl ,<: ro'O t"1 Ill'< ro'O t1 Ill'< ro.a 11 Ill'< t1 Ill'< ro.a t1 Ill'< ro '0 t1 Ill'< ro.a t1 Ill'< t"1 ro n I t"1 ro n I t"1 ro n I t1 ro n I t1 ro n I t1 ro n I t1 ro n I t1 ro n I n n ro <: 1-" n n ro <: 1-" n n ro <: 1-'- n n ro <: .... n n ro <: 1-'- n n ro < 1-'- n n ro <: .... n n ro <: 1-'- '"'l 1-'- rt ::l 1-'- ::l 1-'- rt ::l 1-'- ::l 1-'- rt ::l 1-'- ::l 1-'- rt ::l 1-'- ::l 1-'- rt ::l .... ::l 1-'- rt ::l 1-'- ::l .... rt ::l I-'-::l 1-'- rt ::l 1-'- ::l 
..... 0 P III ro rt tn III ro rt tn III ro rt tn III ro rt tn ~~ rt tn ~~ rt \in n ~ ~ rt tn III ro rt tn .\0 '"'l I-'P- n I-'P- n I-'P- n I-'P- n n n ..... 0. n 
--..;1> L "0 "00 "0 "00 "0 "00 "0 "00 "0 ~o "0 "00 ~~ 
"0 "00 "0 "00 ot'"' 00 t1 ~ § 00 t1 ~ § 00 t1 ~ § 00 t1 ~ § ~li? t1 00 t1 t1 :3 a ~ i!l 00 t1 ~ ~ I A '0 III 0 '0 III 0 '0 III 0 '0 III 0 0 ro § '0 III 0 ro :3 '0 III 0 1-'0 ro rt ()Q <: ro ro rt ()Q <: ro ro rt ()Q < ro ro rt ()Q <: ro ro rt ()Q ~_ ro ro rt ()Q <: ro ro rt ()Q <: ro ro rt ()Q \o/:'j N t1 ro t1 1-'- t1 t1 ro t1 1-'- t"1 t1 ro t1 1-'- t1 t1 ro t1 1-'- 11 t1 ro t1 -t1 t1 ro t1 1-'- t"1 t1 ro 11 1-'-t1 t1 ro 11 1-'- 11 :::;~ III ro o n III ro o n III ro o n III ro o n III ro ffi ~- III ro ~ n III ro on III ro o n T rt 0 (Jl ~ 1-'- rt 0 (Jl ~ 1-'- rt 0 tn ~ 1-'- rt 0 tn ~ .... rt 0 f/J rt 0 f/J 1-'- :1- ~ en ~ 1-'- rt 0 f/J C 1-'- ...: 1-'- ,." en tn III 1-'- ,." f/J en III 1-'- ,." en en III .... ,." tn f/J III ....... In 1-'- ,." f/J Pi III en en III 1-'- ,." In tn III 0 1-'0 1-'0 1-'0 ..... g I-' g ~~ 0 ..... 0 Jt I-' ::l ...: ::l ...: ::l ...: ::l >< ~o ::l >< ::l ro 0 ro 0 ro 0 ~.~ ~-? (1) 0 III '0 III '0 III '0 ~~ ~~ III '0 t"1 • 11 • t1 • '1 • 11 • 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1~F2 1976 1977 
I. Dresden 3 70 75 71 1 1 
2. Palisades 71 71 
3. Robinson 2 70 71 1 1 
4. Point Beach 1 70 
5. Honticello 70 71 1 1 
6. Quad Cities 71 80 73 2 2 
7. Browns Fer. 1 71 70 72 90 1 73 98 1 73 99 74 1 3 
8. Browns Fer. 2 72 50 73 70 1 74 70 1 74 80 74 99 75 1 3 
9. Oconee 1 71 70 71 '99 73 99 2 73 2 
10. Oconee 2 72 40 72 70 73 80 1 73 99 74 1 2 
II. Quad Cities 2 72 50 72 85 73 1 1 
12. Peach Bot. 2 72 60 73 80 1 73 90 74 1 74 2 
13. Peach Bot. 3 73 30 74 50 1 74 50 74 85 74 1 
14. Salem 1 72 30 73 60 1 74 70 1 75 75 1 76 85 1 76 95 76 77 1 5 
15. Vermont Yan. 71 70 71 99 72 1 1 
16. Ft. Calhoun 1 71 50 72 65 1 73 90 1 73 2 
17. Surry 1 71 65 72 95 1 72 1 
18. Surry 2 72 35 72 65 73 96 1 73 1 
19. Diablo 1 73 35 74 30 1 75 50 1 75 75 76 90 1 76 ql 77 99 , 77 4 
20. 3 Mile lsI. 1 72 40 72 75 72 90 74 95 2 74 2 
Aggregate Delays 11 12 5 -4 1 1 1 35 (Years) 
Easton* 
*Niagara Mohawk Power, 750 MW, GE scheduled operation 71 (according to Electrical World, 1968)was ordered in 1966 and later 
canceled to become Fitzpatrick in 1968. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITS ORDERED IN 1967* 
1973 1974 1975 
<: t;j 
.... (Il 
'"d en ...... 
(Il 'Pl 
t1 Pl '< () , 
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::l .... ::l 
" en 
M 
...... 0 
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...... t;j 
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E 
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'"d 
H 
CIl 
CIl 
c::: 
t>l 
t;j 
1. Bail~ 1176 I I 76 I I 77 I I 1 I 78 I I 1 I 79 I I 1 I I 5 I I 82 125 I 3 I 82 I II 6 II 74 
>< 
E 
o 
t"' 
H 
CIl 
CIl 
~ 
t;j 
2. C~Tstal R. 3 1172 110 I I 73 140 I 1 I 74 155 I 1 I 75 180 I 1 I 75 193 I I 76 193 I 1 I 77 I I 1 I 77 I II 5 11-70 1176 
z: ~~w~~~~:e 1 II;~' ~~, ,;~, ~g I 1 I ;~ 193 ' I 73 '99' ,74, '1' I , I I I I I I ,,2 II =;g II ~~ , 
5. Pt. Beach 2 \\71\50 I \ 72 19511 I 1731 111 II 211-701171 
6. Prairie Isl.l 1172 14°1 1721751 17319°111731 I 1 I ! I II I I I I I I 11111-701173 7. Shoreham 75 761' 1 77 1 77 5 78 20 1 78 35 79 52 1 79 4 73 
~: ~i~~I~ lsI. 2 45_1 ~ I 771 60 11 I 78 170 11 I 78 185 1 I 78 1 II ~ 1I=;g 1173 
10. Arkansas 1 1173 125 1 173 160 I 173 185 I 174 199 11 174 I II 111-701174 
~;: ;1~\1\;~\9311176199111761 111 11;11=;gl\;~ 
iz: ;}-hsl 17419611751 111 11;11=;gll;z 
15. Calvert Cl. 21174 115 1 I 74 135 I 1 75 Iss 11 I 75 170 I I 77 168 12 I 77 185 I I 77 I I 77 I II 3 11-70 1176 
16. Oconee 3 I In 115 1[-73140 r I7lIT4511 74 fa9i 74 II--I~-I -r~I-- I - I 1- I "1 II -70 1174 
17. Salem 2 1173 115 I I 74 140 I 1 T75 135 T rT76132 I IT 79T45 1 31 79- 15-,5 I I 79 159 I 1 79 I 116 11-70 
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18. Browns Fer. 31172 130 I 173150 I 1 174140 I 1 175135 I 1 175175 I 176193 11 I 77. 199 11177 I II 511-70 
19. Prairie Is1.2 1174 120 I 174145 I 174135 I 174165 I 1741 II 11-70 
20. Cook 1 1172 120 I 173 150 11 173175 I 174 195 I 1 175196 \ 1 175 I II 311-70 
21. Cook 2 1173 110 I I 74 130 11 I 75 150 111 76 160 I 1 176151 I 178 157 I 2 I 78 185 I I 78 I I \I 5 1\-70 
22. Zion 2 1173 125 I I 73 150 I I 73 I I 74 190 11 I 741 II 1 11-70 
23. RanchoSeco 11731301 1731501 174175111741931 175199111751 11211-70 
24. Beaver Va11ey 1173 I I 74 130 I 1 I 74 150 I I 74 165 I 175192 I 1 I 76 199 111 76 I \I 3 II 70 
25. Limerick 1 1175 I I 75 I I 79 I 141 79 ' 1 I I 811 2 I 2 I 81 117 I 183 130 12 I 83 I II 8 II 74 
26. Limerick2 11771 1771 1801 1318111111831112183141, \85119121851 1181174 
27. North Anna 1 1174 I I 75 120 I 1 I 75 150 I I 75 160 I I 751 80 I I 77 185 I 2 I 77 196 I I 77 I II 3 II 71 
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28. Hatch 1 1173 130 I 173155 I 174 165 I 1 174 190 I 1741 175 I 111 II 2 11-70 1174 
29. St. Lucie 1173 15 I 174 125 I 1 174 137 I 173 160 11 175180 I 175 198 I 176 I 111 II 3 1170 1176 
~~: ~!iistone 2 11741 I 1 74 125 I 1 74 145 1175cl~ONlc\IL7iID90 I 1751 I I ~ I I 111 11 70 IpS 
Aggregate Delays II 113 I 122 I 115 (Years) 17 11 11 89 
*Announcements were made in 1967 except for the following eight plants: Maine Yankee (66), Shoreham (65), Cooper (66), Turkey Pt. 4 (65), 
Salem 2 (66), Cook (66), Rancho Seco (66), St. Lucie (68). 
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1970 1971 1972 
1. Brunslvick 1 75 5 76 15 1 73 35 -1 
2. Brunswick 2 74 10 74 30 74 65 
3. Arnold 1 73 7 Ii 25 1 73 70 -1 
4. Se~ah 1 73 74 25 1 74 45 
5. Seguoyah 2 74 75 15 1 75 35 
6. HidJand 1 74 76 2 18 2 
7. Hid1and 2 75 77 2 79 2 
8. Susquehana 1 77 78 1 79 1 
9. Susquehana 2 79 80 1 81 1 
10. Diablo 2 74 75 5 1 76 12 1 
11. Fermi 2 74 75 1 76 1 
12. Davis Besse 1 74 75 15 1 75 35 
l3. Trojan 74 75 10 1 74 55 -1 
14. Fitzpatrick 73 73 35 73 75 
Aggregate Delays 14 5 (Years) 
15. Caroli~a P & L 
Unit 4 
16. Verplanck 1.1 75 77 78 1 
Aggregate Delays 1 (Years) 
APPENDIX C 
UNITG ORDERED IN 19681 
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1975 1976 1977 
75 2 77 96 77 2 70 
1 70 
1 2 70 
69 1 78 80 1 78 5 70 
69 1 79 70 1 79 5 70 
10 2 82 17 82 8 72 
10 2 81 17 81 6 72 
13 80 33 80 3 73 
5 82 22 82 3 73 
60 1 78 83 1 78 4 70 
1 80 45 80 6 72 
90 77 99 1 77 3 71 
95 76 1 2 71 
1 2 70 
12 5 52 
1. Announcements were made in 1968 except for the following four plants: Midland 1, 2, Susquehana 1, Trojan. These announcements 
were made in 1967. 
2. 821 MW station supplied by GE was announced on January 24, 1968. 
3. Consolidated Edison 1,125 MW, GE-BWR (Peeksvil1e, New York) is delayed due to uncertainty on cooling system. 
Announcements were made on January 10, 1968. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITS ORDERED IN 19701 
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1'1 • Ii • Ii • 1'1 • 1'1 • Ii • 
-1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1. North Anna 2 75 75 50 75 50 76 40 1 76 60 77 55 1 78 74 
2. San Onofre 2 75 76 1 78 2 78 80 I 5 2 81 8 1 81 27 
3. San Onofre 3 76 77 1 79 2 79 81 5 2 83 8 2 83 27 
4. Hatch 2 76 76 77 5 1 78 15 1 78 25 79 30 1 79 70 
5. Aguir re 2 75 76 1 78 5 2 
6. Arkansas 2 76 77 1 77 7 77 16 77 37 49 78 76 
7. LaSalle 1 75 75 77 2 78 1 78 5 78 15 79 40 
8. LaSalle 2 76 76 78 2 /9 1 79 5 79 10 79 35 
9. Bellefonte 1 77 77 79 2 79 79 80 5 1 80 24 
10. Bellefonte 2 78 78 79 1 80 1 80 81 5 1 81 16 
11. Watts Bar 1 76 77 1 77 78 5 1 78 13 78 25 79 51 
12. Watts Bar 2 77 77 78 1 78 5 79 13 1 79 25 80 43 
13. Waterford 3 77 77 78 J 1 79 1 81 2 2 81 17 
14. Farley 2 77 77 77 77 15 77 30 77 45 79 40 
15. Waterford 44 78 
Aggregate Delays 5 15 7 6 9 (Years) 
1. Announcements are made in 1970 for all units except North Anna (67). 
2. Original location Guayama, P.R. is canceled. New project NORCO-NP-1 is announced in September of 1974. 
3. Public hearing and antitrust delays. 
4. Louisiana Power and Light 1,165 MW (C-E, PWR: Westinghouse) announced September 24, 1970. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITS ORDERED IN 1971 
0 <1 t::! 0 <1 t::! 0 <1 Cl 0 <: t::! 0 
<1 t::!IO <: Cl 0 ~. :? 0 ..,. ro 0 ..,. ro 0 ..... ro 0 .... ro 0 ..,. ro 0 ..,. ro 0 ~ ~ '"d Ul f-' ~ ~ '"d Ul I-' §M '"d Ul f-' ~ ~ '"d Ul f-' §M '"d Ul f-' ~ M '"d Ul I-' § M '"d ~ t;' ro I ~ ro I III ro I III ro I III ro ~~ro.a ro I Pl ro ro'"d 'i ~'-<: ro'"d 'i Pl'-<: ro.a rj Ill'-<: ro'"d t1 Ill'-<: ro.a 'i 'i Pl'-<: ro.a 'i ~'-<: 'i ro n I 'i ro n I tiro n I 'i ro n I tiro n I 'i ro n I 'i ro n n n ro <1 ..,. n n ro <: )-'. n n ro <: )-'. n n ~ <: f-'. n n ro <: f-'. n n ro <: .... n n ro ~. f-'. ..... rt ::l ..,. ::l ..,. rt ::l ..,. ::l .... rt ::l ..,. ::l ..,- rt f-'- ::l ..,-rt ::l ..,- ::l ..,·rt ::l 
"'- ::l .... - rt ::l - ::l ~ ro rt Ul Pl ro rt Ul ~ ro rt Ul III ro <1' Ul Pl ro rt Ul Plro rt Ul ~~ rt ~ 0 P I-' 0- 0 1-'0- 0 I-'P- 01-'0- o I-' P- o I-"p. 0 
'"d '"dO '"d '"dO '"d '"dO '"d '"dO '"d '"dO '"d '"dO '"d ~o L ot::! 'i ;;l § @'~ '1 ;;l § ~~ '1 ~ i OCl '1 ;;l § ~~ '1 ;;l § ot::! '1 ~ § OCl '1 ~ '"d ~ 0 0 0 '"d Pl 0 0 '"dIU 0 "0 III 0 A ro rt (JQ <: ro ro rt (JQ <: ro rort (JQ ro rt (JQ <: ro rort (JQ <: ro rort (JQ <: ro ro rt (JQ 
'i ro 'i 
.... - '1 '1 ro '1 ..,- '1 '1ro 'i .... '1 'i ro '1 .... - '1 ",'ro '1 ..,- 'i 
'" ro 
'1 ..... t1 t1 ro 
'" 
1:" t1 N IU ro o n ~ ro o n IU ro o n IU ro o n II> ro o n IU ro o n lI> ro 9 n rt 0 Ul t:: ..,- rt 0 Ul t:: .... rtO til t:: ..,. rt 0 Ul t:: ..... <1'0 til t:: ..... rtO Ul t:: ..... 
:1- ~ (fl .... T .... - H\ (fl Ul II> .... - H\ (fl Ul IU .... - Hl CIl (fl IU .... - H\ (fl (fl IU ",. HI (fl (fl IU .... - Hl Ul (fl IU (fl ill IU 0 1-'0 I-' 0 1-'0 1-'0 I-' 0 I-' 0 ~~ ::l >< ::l >< ::l >< ::l >< ::l ~o ::l >< ::l ro 0 ro 0 ro 0 ro 0 ro 0 IU"O IU"O IU"O 11>"0 Pl'"d IU"O ~'!' t1 • '1 • '1 • '1 • '1 • '1 • 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
I. . 1 Nendoclnno 1 77 79 2 
2. Hendochino 2 77 79 2 
3. Summer 1 77 77 78 1 78 5 79 17 1 79 45 80 1 
4. WPPSS 2~- 77 77 77 2 78 10 1 78 23 80 35 2 80 5 _ Harris 1 77 77 78 1 81 3 84 5 3 84 <5 84 
6. Harris 2 78 78 79 1 82 3 86 5 4 86 <5 86 
7. Harris 3 79 79 80 1 83 3 90 5 7 90 <5 90 
8. Harris 4 80 80 81 1 84 3 88 5 4 88 <5 88 
9. Byron 1 78 78 79 1 80 1 80 1 80 15 81 1 
10. Byron 2 79 79 80 1 81 1 82 1 1 82 10 82 
II. North Anna 3 77 77 77 78 5 1 80 5 2 81 4 1 82 1 
12. North Anna 43 78 78 78 79 2 1 81 2 2 81 2 83 2 
13. Vogt1e 14 78 80 2 80 83 0 3 83 
14. Vogt1e 2 79 81 2 81 84 0 3 84 
15. Beaver Va11~ 2 78 78 81 3 81 82 1 82 
16. Nine Nile Point 2 78 78 80 2 82 1 2 82 5.5 82 
17. Summit 1 79 79 80 1 81 1 
18. Summit 2 82 82 82 84 2 
19. Fulton 1 79 79 81 2 84 3 
20. Fulton 2 79 81 2 83 2 86 3 
Aggregate Delays 6 11 29 29 10 5 (Years) 
-
1. PG & E Units. Alternate sites under consideration. Aggregate Delays (Years) are not shown for this plant. 
2. WPPSS announcement was made in February of 1967. all the rest were made in 1971. 
3. Future status of this unit is currently under review. 
4. Georgia Power Company units were suspended in September of 1974. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITS ORDERED IN 19721 
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3. Pilgrim 2 78 80 2 80 82 
4. Greenwood 2~ 80 80 82 2 84 
5. Greenwood 3 81 82 1 84 2 86 
6. Perry 1 79 79 79 80 1 
7. Perry 2 80 80 80 82 1 
8. Seabrook 1 79 79 79 80 
9. Seabrook 2 81 81 81 82 
10. River Bend 1 79 80 1 80 81 
11. Catawba 1 79 79 81 2 81 
12. Catawba 2 80 80 82 2 82 
13. AGS 1 80 80 85 5 85 
14. AGS 2 80 81 1 87 6 87 
15. Douglas Point 1 80 82 2 85 
16. Douglas Point 2 82 8/. 2 87 
17. Braidwood 1 79 80 1 81 
18. Braidwood 2 80 81 1 82 
19. Comanche Peak 1 80 80 80 5 
20. Comanche Peak 2 82 82 82 
21. Clinch River 
22. St. Lucie 24 79 80 1 80 
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24. Hartsville 1 80 
25. Hartsville 2 81 
26. Hartsville 3 81 
27. Hartsville 4 82 
28. Barton 1 82 
29. Bart:1n 2 83 
30. Surry 35 80 
31. SurrY 4 81 
32. Fermi 3 6 81 
31. SeE/IITGR 1 f 81 82 1S 
34. SCE/HTGR 2 82 83~ 
35 Quanicasse 1 81 
%. Quanicasse 2 82 
17. Perryman 1 79 
38. Perryman 2 80 
Aggregate Delays 
(Years) 
APPENDIX C 
UNITS ORDERED IN 19721 
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1. Announcement Order year are the same for all units except Grand Gulf I, 2 (71) and AGS 1, 2 (71). 
2. Engineering and construction suspended for fi.nancia1 reasons. 
3. United States Government. 
4. Construction suspended in November of 1976. Florida Power and Light. 
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S. Virginia Electric Company 859 MW, B & W - PWR, announcement was made in September of 1972. Construction Pemt 
was issued in December of 1974. 
6. Detroit Edison, 1,220 MW, GE-BWR, Portland Oregon was announced AprilS, 1972. 
7. Desert site, 770 MW, announcement made in May of 1972. 
8. Vidal 1. 
9. Vidal 2. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITS ORDERED IN 1973 
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1. Clinton 1 80 80 
2. Clinton 2 82 83 83 1 
3. Blue Hills 1 81 83 2 
4. Hillstone 3 80 80 
5. Pebble Springs 1 81 
6. A11ens Creek 11 80 80 
7. Perkins 1 81 83 83 1 
8. Perkins 2 81 84 85 3 
9. Perkins 3 81 84 87 5 
10. Cherokee 1 82 84 84 1 
11. Cherokee 2 82 84 86 3 
12. Cherokee 3 82 84 88 5 
13. Jamesport 1 81 81 
14. Future 12 81 
15. Future 2 82 
16. South Texas 1 80 80 
17. South Texas 2 82 82 
18. WPPSS 3 81 81 
19. River Bend 2 81 82 82 
20. Palo Verde 1 81 81 
21. Palo Verde 2 83 5 82 -2 
22. Palo Verde 3 83 5 84 
23. 1990 Unit3 85 90 5 
24. 1992 Unit 86 92 6 
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25. Black Fox 1 
26. Black Fox 2 
27. Skagit 1 
28. Callmvay 1 
29. Wolf Creek 
30. Tyrone 1 
31. Callaway 2 
32. Sterling 1 
33. Davis-Besse 2 
34. Davis-Besse 3 
35. Allens Creek 2 
36. Somerset 14 
37. Somerset 2 
38. T:trone 2 N 
39. Boardman 5 C 
Aggregate Delays 
(Years) 
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34 25 28 28 115 
1. Units 1 and 2 were deferred in September of 1975. Unit 1 was reactivated in October of 1976. Unit 2 was canceled. 
2. Formally Koshkonong 1, 2, alternative sites under consideration. 
3. Corresponds to former AGS 3, 4. 
4. NYSG & E. 1200 MW. GE-BWR. announced 7/13/73, later known as Nuclear Unit 1, 2 (New York). 
5. Portland GE, 1260 MW, B & W - PWR, Portland Oregon was announced on February 16, 1972. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITS ORDERED IN 1974 
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5. Pebble Springs 2 83 85 
6. Blue Hills 2 83 85 2 87 
7. Green County 
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